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HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT:
A MORE COMPELLING CASE FOR DIVERSITY
Jonathan P. Feingold*
Abstract
For four decades, the diversity rationale has offered a lifeline to
affirmative action in higher education. Yet even after forty years, this
critical feature of equal protection doctrine remains constitutionally
insecure and politically fraught. Legal challenges persist, the Justice
Department has launched a new assault on affirmative action, and a
rightward shift on the Supreme Court could usher in an era of increased
hostility toward the concept of diversity itself. The future of race-conscious
admissions may hang in the balance.
In this Article, I contend that the diversity rationale’s present fragility
rests, in part, on its defenders’ failure to center diversity’s most
compelling quality: its ability to promote personal equality within the
university. To fill this void, this Article advances the first comprehensive
case for diversity rooted in each student’s interest in an equal opportunity
to enjoy, regardless of race, the full benefits of university membership.
This framing is appealing, in part, because it makes salient the present
and personal equality harms that students of color suffer when severely
under-represented in predominately white institutions. Race-conscious
admissions, in turn, emerge as an essential component of institutional
efforts to further normative commitments—ranging from racial
integration to individual meritocracy—that should resonate with Justices
across the ideological spectrum.
To support this new framing, I resurrect the Supreme Court’s preBrown desegregation cases. These decisions reinforce the constitutional
infirmity of institutional conditions that compromise a student’s ability,
because of her race, to access the full benefits of university membership. I
then bridge the theory to social science that reveals how environmental
cues—including racial demographics—can exact concrete and
quantifiable burdens on students from negatively stereotyped groups.
Although well-traveled in other domains, this research has only begun to
inform legal scholarship.
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INTRODUCTION
[T]he Committee on Admissions is aware that there is some relationship
between . . . numbers and providing a reasonable environment for those
[black] students admitted.
– Harvard College Admissions Program (1977)1
I had been trying hard to fit in with the rest of my classmates and to get
them to see me as more than just “the Black man in the class.”
– Marky Keaton, UCLA School of Law (2003)2
[W]orries about belonging and potential are pernicious precisely because
they arise from awareness of real social disadvantage before and during
college, including . . . awareness of . . . numeric underrepresentation.
– David S. Yeager et al., Psychologist, UT–Austin (2016)3
For four decades, amid a largely successful assault on affirmative action, the
“diversity rationale” has offered a lifeline to race-conscious admissions in higher
education.4 For those interested in forty more years, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016
decision in Fisher II5 came as a welcome surprise.6 Following eight years of
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978) (Powell, J.) (quoting the
Harvard College Admissions Program).
2 Brief of UCLA School of Law Students of Color as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 554405, at
*8 (quoting Marky Keaton’s testimony regarding his experience at UCLA School of Law
following the passage of Proposition 209, which effectively ended affirmative action in
California) [hereinafter UCLA Law Students Brief].
3 David S. Yeager et al., Teaching a Lay Theory Before College Narrows Achievement
Gaps at Scale, 113 (24) PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. E3341, E3347 (2016) (describing
the psychological harms that underrepresented students of color often confront in college
settings).
4 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003);
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297, 307 (2013). A university could
theoretically justify race-conscious admissions as necessary to remedy specific instances of
discrimination attributable to the university. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307–09; see also City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496 (1989). As a practical matter, this argument
is rarely available.
5 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
6 See Mario L. Barnes et al., Judging Opportunity Lost: Assessing the Viability of RaceBased Affirmative Action After Fisher v. University of Texas, 62 UCLA L. REV. 271, 283–
84 (2015) (“Based on the Court’s opinion in [Fisher I] . . . we may not have to wait until
2028 for a new determination on the efficacy of affirmative action.”); see also William C.
Kidder, Does the LSAT Mirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic Differences in Educational
Attainment?: A Study of Equally Achieving “Elite” College Students, 89 CALIF. L. REV.
1055, 1120 (2001) (“[T]he diversity rationale for affirmative action may soon be rejected or
curtailed by the Supreme Court.”).
1
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litigation,7 the Supreme Court upheld the University of Texas’s race-conscious
admissions program. In so doing, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the diversity
rationale’s status as settled constitutional doctrine.8 Within months of the decision,
Justice Ginsburg went so far as to predict that the Supreme Court had heard its last
case on affirmative action in education.9
This pronouncement already appears pre-mature. Litigants continue to attack
the diversity rationale’s constitutional mooring in cases that appear destined for the
Supreme Court;10 the Justice Department has opened a renewed assault on race-

7 Plaintiff Abigail Fisher filed suit on April 7, 2008. See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at
Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (W.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011),
vacated and remanded, 570 U.S. 297 (2013), and aff’d, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014).
8 See Elise C. Boddie, The Future of Affirmative Action, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 38, 39
(2016) (“[Fisher II] . . . reinforces the legitimacy of the diversity rationale for affirmative
action in higher education and, therefore, underscores a principle of racial inclusion that has
otherwise been absent from the Court’s equal protection doctrine.”).
9 See Adam Liptak, Ginsburg Has a Few Words About Trump, N.Y. TIMES, July 10,
2016, at A1 (quoting Justice Ginsburg as stating: “I don’t expect that we’re going to see
another affirmative action case . . . at least in education.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
10 See STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, ANNUAL REPORT OF STUDENTS FOR FAIR
ADMISSIONS (Aug. 16, 2016), http://samv91khoyt2i553a2t1s05i-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/
wp-content/uploads/2016/08/2016-08-16-2016-Year-End-Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U
JT-YMGL] (highlighting the cases brought against Harvard and the University of North
Carolina). Both suits contest the premise that student body diversity constitutes a compelling
state interest. See Complaint at ¶ 216, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. UNC, 319 F.R.D.
490 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (No. 2:14-cv-954), http://samv91khoyt2i553a2t1s05i-wpengine.net
dna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/SFFA-v.-UNC-Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc
/TLK2-5ZDD]; Complaint at ¶ 494, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President &
Fellows of Harvard Coll., 308 F.R.D. 39 (D. Mass. 2015) (No. 14-cv-14176-ADB),
http://samv91khoyt2i553a2t1s05i-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/
SFFA-v.-Harvard-Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/22BR-7YFK]. In the Harvard litigation,
following a three-week trial that culminated on November 2, 2018, the parties made final
arguments before the district court on February 13, 2019. See Delano R. Franklin & Samuel
W. Zwickel, Harvard Admissions Trial Will Stretch into 2019 with New Hearing, Filings,
The Harvard Crimson (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2018/
11/15/admissions-trial-new-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/EDD5-A8QY].
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conscious admissions;11 and, with the recent appointment of Justice Kavanaugh,12
the Supreme Court now holds five Justices receptive to arguments critical of the
diversity rationale and affirmative action more broadly.13 Should pending litigation
reach the Supreme Court, this reconfigured bench raises legitimate questions about
the diversity rationale’s survival—and by extension, the future of affirmative action
in higher education.
Current threats are compounded by the doctrinal insecurity that has followed
the diversity rationale since its inception in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke.14
Justice Powell, who authored the controlling opinion, embraced student body
11 On July 3, 2018, then-U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced the decision
to rescind a 2011 guidance document concerning the “Voluntary Use of Race to Achieve
Diversity in Postsecondary Education.” See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney
General Jeff Sessions Rescinds 24 Guidance Documents (Jul. 3, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-rescinds-24-guidancedocuments [https://perma.cc/556W-XDGF]. This follows news that the DOJ is investigating
Harvard University’s race-conscious admissions program. See Charlie Savage, Justice Dept.
to Take on Affirmative Action in College Admissions, N.Y. Times (Aug. 1, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2hm3vmf [https://perma.cc/Y7AU-X3WD] (“The Trump administration is
preparing to redirect resources of the Justice Department’s civil rights division toward
investigating and suing universities over affirmative action admissions policies deemed to
discriminate against white applicants.”); Susan Svrluga & Nick Anderson, Justice
Department Investigating Harvard’s Affirmative Action Policies, WASH. POST (Nov. 21,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/11/21/justicedepartment-investigating-harvards-affirmative-action-policies/?utm_term=.6400f4b5a606
[https://perma.cc/7PDB-VNGP].
12 Justice Kavanaugh was confirmed to the Supreme Court on October 6, 2018 and
takes the seat formerly held by Justice Kennedy. See Clare Foran & Stephen Collinson, Brett
Kavanaugh sworn in as Supreme Court justice, CNN POLITICS (Oct. 6, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/06/politics/kavanaugh-final-confirmation-vote/index.html.
Justice Kavanaugh has repeatedly expressed skepticism about the legality of affirmative
action. See Kadia Tubman, Kavanaugh’s Views on Affirmative Action Draw Scrutiny,
YAHOO NEWS (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.yahoo.com/news/kavanaughs-viewsaffirmative-action-draw-scrutiny-113120833.html [https://perma.cc/B3LL-ZBS3].
13 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (“Three of the
dissenters . . . examined the Law School’s interest in student body diversity on the merits
and concluded it was not compelling.”); see also Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2220 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“UT says that the program furthers its interest in the educational benefits of
diversity, but it has failed to define that interest with any clarity . . . .”); id. at 2223 (“These
are laudable goals, but they are not concrete or precise, and they offer no limiting principle
for the use of racial preferences.”); Rachel D. Godsil, Why Race Matters in Physics Class,
64 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 40, 42 (2016) (discussing Chief Justice Robert’s hostile questioning
in Fisher I).
14 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978). This fragility is reflected in recent commentary critical of
the diversity rationale. See, e.g., Megan McArdle, Opinion, Drop the Euphemisms Around
Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, July 11, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/drop-the-euphemisms-around-affirmative-action/2018/07/11/511bb61e-8482-11e8-9e80403a221946a7_story.html?utm_term=.ebd9d8c67568 [https://perma.cc/5D3S-4WJM].
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diversity as a vehicle to promote the university’s First Amendment interests.15 This
First Amendment framing, even if a “master compromise”16 that has offered a vital
constitutional hook for race-conscious admissions, undersold the case for diversity
in ways that continue to impoverish the concept’s constitutional foundation and
political appeal.17
Specifically, Justice Powell elided what may be diversity’s most compelling
quality: its ability to promote personal equality within the university.18 More
precisely, Justice Powell’s First Amendment focus obscured how racial diversity can
buffer students of color against the “present and personal”19 equality harms that
15 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12 (1978) (“[Student body
diversity] clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education.
Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been
viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.”).
16 Stephen M. Rich, What Diversity Contributes to Equal Opportunity, 89 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1011, 1098 (2016) (“Justice Powell offered the nation a master compromise in the
concept of ‘diversity’ itself—a framework that would allow limited voluntary race-conscious
efforts at desegregation to continue, in a social form that would preserve the Constitution as
a domain of neutral principles.” (quoting Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination
and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1470, 1539 (2004))); see also Paul Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the
Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 918
(1983) (“It was his vote, and even more, his singular (in both senses) opinion, that produced
what has been called the ‘Solomonic’ result in Bakke.”).
17 Critique and dissatisfaction, from the Left and Right, have followed the diversity
rationale since Bakke. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1622, 1622 (2003) (“[T]he concept of diversity . . . is a serious distraction in the ongoing
efforts to achieve racial justice . . . .”); Gabriel J. Chin, Bakke to the Wall: The Crisis of
Bakkean Diversity, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 881, 930 (1996) (characterizing diversity
as pretext for a project of backward-looking remediation); Stacy L. Hawkins, A Deliberative
Defense of Diversity: Moving Beyond the Affirmative Action Debate to Embrace a 21st
Century View of Equality, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 75, 78 (2012); Charles R. Lawrence III,
Each Other’s Harvest: Diversity’s Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 757, 770–71 (1997)
(“[Grounding the diversity rationale in the First Amendment] constitutionalizes the power of
a privileged educational establishment to determine what learning shall be valued and who
shall be taught.”); Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity
Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381, 416 n.170, 442
(1998) (“Because academic freedom is a neutral principle favoring no particular substantive
end, I do not believe it provides an adequate constitutional basis for the diversity rationale.”);
Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher
Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 323–24 (2006) (“Diversity sometimes operates as
a goal in search of a justification. Its legitimacy and staying power depend upon more [of] a
robust articulation of its underlying value.”); see generally Mario L. Barnes, “The More
Things Change . . .”: New Moves for Legitimizing Racial Discrimination in a “Post-Race”
World, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2043 (2016) (reviewing critiques from the Left).
18 See infra Part I.A.
19 McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) (“We
conclude that the conditions under which this appellant is required to receive his education
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derive from severe underrepresentation in predominately white institutions.20 This
elision matters, in part, because it renders invisible a core diversity function that
furthers values—ranging from racial integration to individual meritocracy—that
should appeal to Justices across the ideological spectrum.21 Accordingly, when
uplifted, this equality framework has the potential to buttress the doctrinal and
normative purchase of affirmative action itself.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I offers a re-reading of the Supreme
Court’s seminal diversity rationale cases. Although often overlooked, as early as
Bakke, the Supreme Court linked racial diversity to the substantive experience of
students of color. Attention to diversity’s equality function has continued to grow in
the years since.22 Yet even as scholars and jurists excavate the relationship between
diversity and personal equality, common accounts of diversity continue to underdescribe and doctrinally marginalize the core equality interests at stake—a result
that hinders efforts to ease lingering anxieties about the diversity rationale itself.23
To fill this analytical void and deepen common portrayals of diversity, Part II
introduces the concept of “equal university membership.”24 This concept embodies
deprive him of his personal and present right to the equal protection of the laws.” (emphasis
added)).
20 Claims of underrepresentation presume—often implicitly—an appropriate numerical
baseline. See Jerry Kang, Negative Action Against Asian Americans: The Internal Instability
of Dworkin’s Defense of Affirmative Action, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1996).
The same applies to diversity, a term that presumes some level of variance within a given
population. For a multitude of reasons, the precise level of racial variance necessary to
achieve the full benefits of diversity will likely turn, in part, on each university’s local context
and history. Nonetheless, across contexts, more variance (as measured by a student body’s
racial demographics) will reduce the likelihood that students from negatively stereotyped
racial groups suffer unique, identity-contingent harms that their peers never have to face. See
generally Nilanjana Dasgupta, Ingroup Experts and Peers as Social Vaccines Who Inoculate
the Self-Concept: The Stereotype Inoculation Model, 22 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 231, 237 (2011)
(reviewing research on the negative effects of solo status and token representation)
[hereinafter Ingroup Experts].
21 See infra Part III.
22 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1130, 1140
(2013). This is reflected, for instance, in the Supreme Court’s increased attention to concepts
such as “critical mass” and “racial isolation.” See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
318 (2003).
23 See generally supra note 13.
24 In this Article, I introduce the concept of equal university membership to fortify the
proposition that diversity constitutes a compelling interest that justifies race-conscious
admissions. Although beyond the scope of this Article, one might query whether conditions
that deprive a student of equal university membership would create a cognizable injury that
supports an affirmative discrimination claim. Moreover, my focus on higher education is not
meant to circumscribe equal membership concerns to the university context. Assuming such
concerns travel to, for instance, the employment context, the diversity rationale’s viability as
a defense for affirmative action may indeed transcend higher education. Cf. Russell G. Pearce
et al., Difference Blindness vs. Bias Awareness: Why Law Firms with the Best of Intentions
Have Failed to Create Diverse Partnerships, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2407, 2423 (2015).
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the proposition that within any university, every student has an interest in enjoying,
regardless of race,25 the full benefits of university membership.26 All students have
an interest in equal university membership. All students are not, however, similarly
situated vis-à-vis one another or the institution. For students of color, environmental
factors—including the absence of racial diversity—can exact unique, identitycontingent headwinds that have the potential to compromise learning, social and
academic engagement, and performance. To concretize the theory, I offer a
taxonomy of the principle benefits derivative of university membership. I then draw
on student testimonials and empirical scholarship that underscore the same basic
insight: numbers matter, in part, because severe underrepresentation can undermine
a student’s ability to enjoy the full benefits of university membership.27
Part III concludes by detailing the broader doctrinal and political appeal of a
diversity rationale that centers the relationship between racial diversity and personal
equality within the university. I first invoke the Supreme Court’s pre-Brown
desegregation decisions to reinforce the constitutional infirmity of institutional
conditions that compromise a student’s interest in equal university membership. I
then explore how student body diversity, as a driver of personal equality, furthers
multiple values that already anchor contemporary equal protection doctrine.
I. GESTURES TO EQUALITY
A. Regents of University of California v. Bakke: Eliding Equality
The diversity rationale emerged in Regents of University of California v.
Bakke,28 a 1978 case involving the UC Davis Medical School’s race-conscious
25 In this Article, to promote analytical manageability, I focus on the relationship
between racial diversity, racial identity, and equal university membership. This is in part a
function of the particular status race holds within the Supreme Court’s equality
jurisprudence. That said, given the complexities inherent to identity, future scholarship that
examines the relationship between diversity and equal university membership would benefit
from a more intersectional and expansive lens.
26 As I describe in greater detail below, “equal university membership” has roots in the
concept of equal educational opportunity but limits the unit of analysis to a single educational
institution. See infra Parts II & III.A.
27 See infra Part II.B. This Article explores the related phenomena of social identity
threat and stereotype threat. These literatures are distinct from the social science—much
from the field of education—that Justice O’Connor highlighted in Grutter. See Grutter, 539
U.S. at 330 (“In addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at trial,
numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and ‘better
prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them
as professionals.’” (citation omitted)). For an overview of the social science presented to
justify diversity across Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher, see Kyneshawau Hurd & Victoria C.
Plaut, Diversity Entitlement: Does Diversity-Benefits Ideology Undermine Inclusion?, 112
NW. U. L. REV. 1605, 1609 (2018).
28 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Eboni S. Nelson has traced the diversity rationale’s origin to
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950), and

66

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

admissions program. Justice Powell, who authored the controlling opinion, struck
down the challenged program.29 Yet in so doing, he left open the door for raceconscious admissions.30 Specifically, Justice Powell embraced student body
diversity as a constitutionally compelling interest that, under certain circumstances,
could justify such policies.31
Scholars routinely highlight Justice Powell’s First Amendment mooring.32 This
is understandable. Justice Powell expressly championed diversity as a mechanism to
further the university’s First Amendment interests.33 Nonetheless, by focusing on
Justice Powell’s esteem for diversity’s “discourse benefits,”34 common accounts
often overlook a separate diversity story embedded within Powell’s opinion—one
rooted in the relationship between racial diversity and the educational experience of
students of color. Even as he lauded academic freedom and the “robust exchange of
ideas,” Justice Powell did not—perhaps could not—wholly decouple diversity from
a university’s obligation to ensure that all of its students, irrespective of race, receive
an equal education.35
To locate this deeper diversity story, one must look below the surface of Justice
Powell’s opinion to the sources on which he relied.36 This begins with the Harvard
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950). See Eboni S. Nelson, Examining the Costs of
Diversity, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 592–93 (2009). Whether one places the diversity
rationale’s origin in Bakke or this earlier caselaw, Mclaurin and Sweatt offer a valuable
anchor for contemporary debates about the constitutional appeal of racially diverse student
bodies. See infra Part III.A.
29 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306–11 (1978).
30 Id.
31 Justice Powell rejected three alternative rationales: (1) reducing the contemporary
underrepresentation of students from historically marginalized groups within the Medical
School; (2) countering the effects of societal discrimination; and (3) increasing the number
of physicians likely to practice in underserved communities. Id.
32 See, e.g., Elise C. Boddie, The Indignities of Color Blindness, 64 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 64, 71 n.26 (2016) (“[T]he diversity rationale in higher education
admissions . . . is rooted in First Amendment freedoms.”). For scholarship critical of
Powell’s First Amendment frame, see supra note 17.
33 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12, 313 (“Thus, in arguing that its universities must be
accorded the right to select those students who will contribute the most to the ‘robust
exchange of ideas,’ petitioner invokes a countervailing constitutional interest, that of the First
Amendment.”).
34 Thomas H. Lee, University Dons and Warrior Chieftains: Two Concepts of Diversity,
72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301, 2305 (2004) (“What I have called ‘discourse’ benefits are the
core ‘educational benefits’ of student body diversity, and they are, unsurprisingly, grounded
in ‘the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university
environment.’”).
35 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Charles R.
Lawrence III, Each Other’s Harvest: Diversity’s Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. at 765
(“But I believe that this distinction is misconceived. The diversity rationale is inseparable
from the purpose of remedying our society’s racism.”).
36 Justice Powell drew upon Princeton and Harvard—institutional elites to which he
held at least one personal connection (he received an LLM from Harvard in 1932)—as
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College Admissions Plan (“Harvard Plan”),37 which Justice Powell celebrated as an
“illuminating example” of a constitutional admissions policy.38 According to Justice
Powell, the Harvard Plan took “race into account in achieving the educational
diversity valued by the First Amendment . . . .”39 Justice Powell praised the Harvard
Plan’s flexibility, which he juxtaposed against the policy at issue in Bakke.40 To
reinforce this point, Powell quoted the following passage from the Harvard Plan:
But that awareness [of the necessity of including more than a token
number of black students] does not mean that the Committee sets a
minimum number of blacks or of people from west of the Mississippi who
are to be admitted. It means only that in choosing among thousands of
applicants who are not only ‘admissible’ academically but have other
strong qualities, the Committee, with a number of criteria in mind, pays
some attention to distribution among many types and categories of
students.41
The bracketed text, which Justice Powell inserted to clarify the reference to
“that awareness,” deserves particular attention. Taken out of context, the inserted
language suggests that Harvard’s vision of diversity aligned with Justice Powell’s.
The problem is, this reading—which flows naturally from Justice Powell’s
opinion—obscures a key reason why Harvard embraced diversity. Like Powell,
Harvard viewed racial tokenism as a threat to the marketplace of thought required
of a great institution.42 But Harvard also appreciated a separate and distinct threat in
authoritative voices on the benefits of student body diversity. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312
n.48; TIMOTHY L. HALL, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 393
(2001).
37 After Bakke, legal scholars and university administrators viewed the Harvard Plan as
a blueprint for a constitutionally compliant race-conscious admissions policy. See Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335–38 (2003).
38 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315–17, 321–24.
39 Id. at 316.
40 See id. at 289, 316. Justice Powell also lauded the Harvard Plan’s expansive view of
diversity, which was captured by the view that “[a] farm boy from Idaho can bring something
to Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer,” and “a black student can usually bring
something that a white person cannot offer.” Id. at 316. Although rarely described as such,
these statements reflect the value of intra-racial diversity and inter-racial diversity
respectively. See Carbado, supra note 22; Boddie, supra note 32.
41 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316 (brackets in original).
42 Powell’s discussion of discourse benefits assumes that a well-functioning
marketplace of ideas requires some degree of equality—at least as to the balance between
majority and minority perspectives. Although undeveloped in his opinion, this insight
reflects the inherent relationship between principles traditionally located within the First
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment, respectively. See Akhil Reed Amar,
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999) (describing the interpretive technique
of “intratextualism”); Cedric Merlin Powell, Schools, Rhetorical Neutrality, and the Failure
of the Colorblind Equal Protection Clause, 10 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 362, 368 (2008)
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racial tokenism. Specifically, Harvard expressed concern that severe
underrepresentation would uniquely burden black students and, in so doing,
undermine their ability to receive an education equal to their white Harvard
classmates.43
This point is lost in Bakke, however, because Justice Powell omitted from his
opinion the relevant portion of the Harvard Plan.44 In the paragraph that immediately
preceded the language he quoted, the Harvard Plan stated the following:
Comparably, 10 or 20 black students could not begin to bring to their
classmates and to each other the variety of points of view, backgrounds
and experiences of blacks in the United States. Their small numbers might
also create a sense of isolation among the black students themselves and
thus make it more difficult for them to develop and achieve their potential.
Consequently, when making its decisions, the Committee on Admissions
is aware that there is some relationship between numbers and achieving
the benefits to be derived from a diverse student body, and between
numbers and providing a reasonable environment for those students
admitted.45
As the foregoing reveals, Harvard’s vision of diversity transcended the First
Amendment, academic freedom, and discourse benefits. Critically, Harvard
observed that racial equality within the university was inseparable from, and in fact
dependent on, racial diversity within the university.46 Notwithstanding its centrality
within the Harvard Plan, this insight never penetrated Justice Powell’s opinion nor
his defense of diversity. Bakke, in turn, introduced a doctrinal justification for raceconscious admissions that under-sold the benefits of a racially diverse student body.
Beyond the Harvard Plan, Justice Powell missed at least one other opportunity
to uplift the relationship between racial diversity and equality.47 As if preempting an
(“Indeed, the First and Fourteenth Amendments should be read together to support positive,
race-conscious remedial approaches to the eradication of caste (and resegregation).”); Robert
Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517,
1520 (1997) (“In this way the value of equality is installed in the heart of a revised account
of the First Amendment. The tension between equality and liberty dissolves ‘once we
understand that equality need not be seen as an independent value, based solely on the
Fourteenth Amendment, but rather that it has First Amendment dimensions.’” (quoting
OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE
POWER 87 (1996))).
43 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321–24.
44 Justice Powell did, however, include the complete text of the Harvard Plan as an
appendix to his opinion. See id. at 321.
45 Id. at 323 (emphasis added).
46 See id.
47 Although unrelated to his discussion of diversity, Justice Powell did recognize that,
under certain conditions, race-conscious admissions may be necessary to promote a more
equitable and meritocratic admissions process. See id. at 306 n.43 (“Racial classifications in
admissions conceivably could serve a fifth purpose, one which petitioner does not articulate:
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anticipated critique, Powell argued that diversity’s pedagogical benefits transcended
the undergraduate context and extended to, for instance, the Medical School at issue
in Bakke.48 To underscore this point, Powell invoked Sweatt v. Painter,49 a 1950
Supreme Court decision that struck down a Texas law barring African Americans
from the University of Texas Law School (“UT Law”). Powell quoted the following
language from Sweatt:
The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot
be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which
the law interacts. Few students and no one who has practiced law would
choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of
ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is concerned.50
As with the Harvard plan, when read out of context,51 this language naturally
buttresses Justice Powell’s First Amendment rationale: racial diversity constitutes a
prerequisite for a robust exchange of ideas. But when read in context, the First
Amendment frame gives way to the core equality concerns that permeated Sweatt.
Sweatt was not a First Amendment case; neither the question presented, the
Supreme Court’s holding, nor the quoted language principally implicated the law
fair appraisal of each individual’s academic promise in the light of some cultural bias in
grading or testing procedures. To the extent that race and ethnic background were considered
only to the extent of curing established inaccuracies in predicting academic performance, it
might be argued that there is no “preference” at all.”); see also Jonathan Feingold, Racing
Towards Color-blindness: Stereotype Threat and the Myth of Meritocracy, 3 GEO. J.L. &
MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 231, 266 (2011) (discussing the lack of attention to Justice
Powell’s observation that, in certain contexts, race-conscious policies might be necessary to
promote more equitable and meritocratic admissions) [hereinafter Feingold, Racing Towards
Color-blindness].
48 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313–24.
49 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
50 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (quoting Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634).
51 I refer to at least two levels of “context.” Narrowly, context refers to the Supreme
Court’s full opinion in Sweatt. Broadly, context refers to the societal realities that informed
the Court’s reasoning and holding. Justice Vinson, who authored Sweatt, recognized that
context matters:
It may be argued that excluding petitioner from that school is no different from
excluding white students from the new law school. This contention overlooks
realities. It is unlikely that a member of a group so decisively in the majority,
attending a school with rich traditions and prestige which only a history of
consistently maintained excellence could command, would claim that the
opportunities affor[d]ed him for legal education were unequal to those held open
to petitioner. That such a claim, if made, would be dishonored by the State, is no
answer. Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate
imposition of inequalities.
Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634–35 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
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school’s (or its students’) interest in discourse benefits.52 To the contrary, Sweatt
addressed basic equal protection harms caused by de jure racial segregation—
specifically, the deprivation of equal educational opportunity.53 Indeed, the very
language Justice Powell quoted arose within the Supreme Court’s detailed rebuke of
Texas’s racially discriminatory law.54
Even if masked by Justice Powell’s opinion, the Harvard Plan and Sweatt speak
to each other in important respects. There are, of course, meaningful differences. In
Sweatt, the threat to equality came from positive law that formally excluded African
Americans from UT Law and deprived them of the myriad tangible and intangible
benefits derivative a UT Law education. With Harvard, the threat to equality was
not formal exclusion. Nonetheless, Harvard recognized that admission to the
university was insufficient to guarantee equal educational opportunities therein.
Absent racial diversity, those African Americans admitted would suffer racedependent headwinds that, as a practical matter, would undermine the quality of their
education relative to their white peers. Thus, irrespective of the source of harm, the
Harvard Plan and Sweatt cohere around the basic principle that all students,
regardless of race, have an interest in enjoying the full benefits of university
membership.
B. Grutter v. Bollinger: Approaching “Critical Mass”
If Bakke birthed the diversity rationale, Grutter v. Bollinger secured its place
within the Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence. Grutter involved a
challenge to the University of Michigan Law School’s (“Law School”) admissions
policy, which permitted admissions officials to consider applicant race.55 In a 5-4
decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Law School’s policy.56 Justice O’Connor,

This is not to say that First Amendment principles were absent from Sweatt.
Nonetheless, invoking Sweatt to advance a siloed First Amendment case for diversity
untethers the decision from the equal protection concerns that motivated the Supreme Court’s
reasoning and conclusions. Also, as discussed in greater detail in Part III, Justice Powell
missed an opportunity to link the equality harms that flow from a lack of diversity with the
harms associated with de jure segregation.
53 See Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 631–36. Justice Vinson referenced “academic vacuum” not
to invoke (the absence of) discourse benefits, but rather to evidence the Texas law’s
deleterious effects on African Americans. Id. at 634. This harm included the lost opportunity
to interact and build relationships with whites, who comprised 85 percent of the state
population and “most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with whom
[Sweatt] will inevitably be dealing when he becomes a member of the Texas Bar.” Id. Given
Sweatt’s exclusion from “such a substantial and significant segment of society,” the Court
could not conclude that the education available to Sweatt was “substantially equal to that
which he would [have] receive[d] if admitted to the University of Texas Law School.” Id.
54 See id. at 631–36; see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313.
55 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003).
56 Id. at 343.
52
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who authored the majority opinion, adopted Justice Powell’s conclusion that student
body diversity serves a compelling state interest.57
Scholars have debated the degree to which Justice O’Connor transcended
Justice Powell’s First Amendment mooring.58 On the one hand, Justice O’Connor
embraced a vision of diversity animated by broad democratic values59 and
commitments to societal access, inclusion, and equality.60 Yet as I discuss below,
Id. at 329 (“Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse
student body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of
the Law School’s proper institutional mission . . . .”). In dissent, Justice Kennedy also located
the diversity rationale within “a tradition, grounded in the First Amendment, of
acknowledging a university’s conception of its educational mission.” Id. at 387 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
58 See infra notes 60–61.
59 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331–32 (“The United States, as amicus curiae, affirms that
‘[e]nsuring that public institutions are open and available to all segments of American
society, including people of all races and ethnicities, represents a paramount government
objective.’ And, ‘[n]owhere is the importance of such openness more acute than in the
context of higher education.’” (citation omitted)); id. at 331 (“‘[E]ducation . . . is the very
foundation of good citizenship.’ For this reason, the diffusion of knowledge and opportunity
through public institutions of higher education must be accessible to all individuals
regardless of race or ethnicity.” (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)));
see also Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our
Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 118 (2003). Justice O’Connor also applauded
diversity’s ability to promote institutional legitimacy:
57

In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it
is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society
must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational institutions
that provide this training.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
60 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331–32, 333; id. at 338 (“By virtue of our Nation’s struggle
with racial inequality, [underrepresented students of color] are both likely to have
experiences of particular importance to the Law School’s mission, and less likely to be
admitted in meaningful numbers on criteria that ignore those experiences.”); see also
Carbado, supra note 22, at 1143 (identifying eight benefits of diversity captured by Justice
O’Connor in Grutter); Liu, supra note 17, at 416–17 (“The diversity rationale also has a
foundation in the Fourteenth Amendment—not in the remedial duties just discussed, but
rather in principles of equal protection that express the central democratic values underlying
our constitutional order.”); Rich, supra note 16, at 1027 (“[Grutter] defined that mission,
however, somewhat more broadly by placing greater emphasis on the larger social role of
public university education, both in the marketplace and in our democracy.”); Robert C. Post,
Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 59 (2003) (“Although Grutter casts itself as merely endorsing Justice Powell’s
opinion in Bakke, Grutter’s analysis of diversity actually differs quite dramatically from
Powell’s.”); Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1366 (2011) (“In Bakke,
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even as Justice O’Connor embraced a comparably broader vision of diversity and
marked concerns about racial equality within the university, she ultimately proffered
a diversity defense anchored to the discourse benefits Justice Powell had
championed in Bakke.
In fact, the strongest case for diversity as a driver of personal equality did not
come from Justice O’Connor herself. Rather, it arose in the testimony of several Law
School administrators who Justice O’Connor invoked to unpack the term “critical
mass.”61 The administrators explained that “critical mass” referred to the general
threshold of “underrepresented minority students” necessary to “realize the
educational benefits of a diverse student body.”62 But as the quoted testimony
reflects, the administrators included among these benefits an improved educational
environment for students of color.63 The administrators testified, for instance, that a
critical mass “encourages underrepresented minority students to participate in the
classroom and not feel isolated.”64 They further explained that a critical mass could
mitigate the force of racial stereotypes and foster an environment in which students
of color do not feel “like spokespersons for their race.”65
In many respects, these observations track those embedded within the Harvard
Plan—specifically, Harvard’s recognition that there is “some relationship between
numbers and . . . providing a reasonable environment for those students [of color]
admitted.”66 Justice O’Connor did, indeed, quote this very language in her defense
of the Law School’s goal to attain a critical mass.67 Worth noting, however, is that
Justice O’Connor grounded neither her defense of a critical mass nor her invocation
of the Harvard Plan on Harvard’s observation that a lack of diversity can burden
students of color and thereby compromise their education. To the contrary, Justice
O’Connor praised the concept of “critical mass” because it, like the Harvard Plan,
permitted a flexible admissions regime in which “each applicant is evaluated as an
individual and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or gender the defining
feature of his or her application.”68 Thus, in ways not dissimilar to Justice Powell’s
engagement with the Harvard Plan in Bakke, Justice O’Connor marked diversity’s
Justice Powell’s justification for diversity focused on the First Amendment and educational
concerns; by contrast, Justice O’Connor’s restatement in Grutter focused on concerns of
social cohesion more generally.”).
61 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318–19.
62 Id. at 318.
63 Id. at 318–19.
64 Id. at 318.
65 Id. at 319, 333 (“[D]iminishing the force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of
the Law School’s mission, and one that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of
minority students.”).
66 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978).
67 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336 (“As the Harvard Plan described by Justice Powell
recognized, there is of course some relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits
to be derived from a diverse student body, and between numbers and providing a reasonable
environment for those students admitted.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
68 Id. at 336–37; id. at 330 (“Rather, the Law School’s concept of critical mass is defined
by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce.”).
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equality function only to omit this insight from her express defense of diversity as a
constitutionally compelling interest.
Professor Stephen Rich recently made a similar observation.69 He noted that
Justice O’Connor “acknowledge[d] Michigan Law School’s expressed purposes to
use affirmative action to foster minority inclusion and to relieve its minority
students’ experiences of racial isolation, but nowhere within [her] list of diversity’s
educational benefits does either purpose appear.”70 This diagnosis is accurate, yet
may actually understate the dissonance in Justice O’Connor’s opinion. Even within
that “list of diversity’s educational benefits” are items that Justice O’Connor could
have framed within a vision of diversity attentive to the relationship between racial
diversity and racial equality within the university.
Specifically, Justice O’Connor lauded diversity for its potential to “promote[]
cross-racial understanding, help[] to break down racial stereotypes, and enable[]
students to better understand persons of different races.”71 These benefits could be
understood to serve multiple ends. Consider, for instance, racial stereotypes and
cross-racial understanding, two concepts that go hand-in-hand. To the extent racial
stereotypes and a lack of cross-racial understanding inform classroom conversations
and interpersonal interactions, the impact will not fall evenly on all students. All
students may suffer if stereotypes and cross-racial misunderstanding undermine the
opportunity to gain a more “enlighten[ed]” understanding of society and become
prepared for “an increasingly diverse workforce and society.”72 But beyond stifling
classroom conversations, racial stereotypes and cross-racial misunderstanding have
the potential to uniquely burden students from negatively stereotyped groups—that
is, students of color who may themselves become the targets of such stereotypes and
misunderstandings.73 In turn, lifting stereotypes and promoting cross-racial
understanding does more than promote lively discussion. It also fosters a more
equitable learning environment by reducing identity-contingent headwinds that
students of color may otherwise face in the classroom.
See Rich, supra note 16, at 1035–36.
Id.
71 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). These
benefits are notable, in part, because they are racially inflected. See Post, supra note 60, at
70 (“The account of diversity embraced by Grutter does not conceive of race as simply one
element in a potentially infinite universe of differences. It instead points to the particular and
unique value of racial diversity.”). It is unclear if Justice O’Conner would agree that her
“diversity rationale” privileged racial diversity. In the same opinion that she embraced racespecific benefits, O’Connor applauded the Law School for looking beyond race to “the broad
range of qualities and experiences that may be considered valuable contributions to student
body diversity.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338.
72 Id. at 330. Cf. Akhil Amar & Neal Katyal, Bakke’s Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745,
1778 (1996) (“Critics have portrayed diversity as a tool only to help whites understand
blacks—or as an exploitative way of adding spice to a white mix. We disagree . . . If a
diversity program does not, in practice, allow all students to learn from each other, then the
program is not serving the state’s interest in diversity—and the school should not use the
‘diversity’ slogan to show how the program passes constitutional muster.”).
73 See infra Part II.B.
69
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Justice O’Connor did not, however, praise the foregoing benefits for their
ability to improve the classroom environment for students of color. This is revealed
by her explanation that “[t]hese benefits are important and laudable” because they
promote classroom discussion that is “livelier, more spirited, and simply more
enlightening and interesting.”74 Thus, even when Justice O’Connor identified
benefits that sound in equality, she situated them within a diversity defense that
continued to privilege discourse benefits.75 Accordingly, Justice O’Connor missed
an opportunity to advance the First Amendment frame Justice Powell had proffered
in Bakke.76 And even if the constitutional inquiry were constrained to the diversity
benefits that further the “Law School’s missions,”77 as Justice O’Connor suggested,
it would be hard to explain why that mission requires an educational “atmosphere
which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation,”78 but not one in
which all students, regardless of race, can enjoy the full benefits of that atmosphere.
C. Fisher I & Fisher II: Maintaining the Status Quo
The Fisher litigation, which culminated in 2016 when the Supreme Court
upheld the University of Texas’s race-conscious admissions policy, did little to
disrupt the diversity rationale embodied by Grutter.79 Justice Kennedy, writing for
the majority, reaffirmed Grutter’s principal holding that “a university may institute
a race-conscious admissions program as a means of obtaining the educational
benefits that flow from student body diversity.”80 Still, two points are worth noting.
First, there was no guarantee that Grutter would survive Fisher, a reality that raised
concern across the country.81 To the surprise of many, Justice Kennedy—who had
dissented in Grutter just a decade earlier—provided the decisive vote in Fisher.82
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
HARV. L. REV. 493, 587 (2003).
76 This also appears to be how other Justices viewed these benefits. See Grutter, 539
U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (framing “cross-racial understanding” as a matter of “good
citizenship”).
77 Id. at 333 (majority opinion) (“To the contrary, diminishing the force of such
stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School’s mission, and one that it cannot
accomplish with only token numbers of minority students.”).
78 Id. at 363.
79 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207–08 (2016).
80 Id.; see also Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013) (“[The Grutter Court] endorsed
Justice Powell’s conclusion . . . that the attainment of a diversity student body is a
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education.”).
81 See generally Barnes et al., supra note 6.
82 See Elise C. Boddie, The Constitutionality of Racially Integrative Purpose, 38
CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 533 (2016) (“Justice Kennedy surprised many with his majority
opinion in Fisher II upholding a race-conscious policy in college admissions.”). Unlike the
other Grutter dissenters, Justice Kennedy did not reject the diversity rationale. In Grutter
and elsewhere, Justice Kennedy championed diversity while rejecting a rigidly colorblind
jurisprudence that would condemn any race-conscious policy. See id.; see also Parents
74
75
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Second, certain limited gestures to equality present in Grutter carried through
to Fisher II. Specifically, Justice Kennedy grounded his support for the University
of Texas’s admissions policy, in part, on the observation “that minority students
admitted under the [race-neutral admissions] regime experienced feelings of
loneliness and isolation.”83 Nonetheless, mirroring Justice O’Connor, Justice
Kennedy did not leverage this observation into a more holistic and comprehensive
defense of diversity tied to the personal equality interests of actual University of
Texas students. As such, the Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence
remains tethered to a diversity rationale that, at its core, obscures one of diversity’s
most constitutionally compelling qualities.
II. EQUAL UNIVERSITY MEMBERSHIP
Part I identified moments in which Supreme Court opinions have marked the
relationship between racial diversity and personal equality within the university. Yet
as the foregoing reveals, this relationship remains under-theorized and peripheral to
the Supreme Court’s express defense of diversity as a compelling interest. As a
result, the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence continues to understate
the full value and function of a racially diverse student body.
To fill the void, this Part takes up what the Supreme Court has yet to do:
integrate into the diversity rationale’s core logic the basic observation that students
of color encounter identity-contingent harms in educational environments that lack
racial diversity. To accomplish this, I first explore the principal benefits that flow
from university membership. I then draw on student testimony and social science to
elucidate how racial disparities can compromise a student’s ability, because of her
race, to enjoy these distinct but related benefits. This exercise illuminates how racial
diversity furthers a university’s obligation to ensure that all students, regardless of
race, can access and enjoy the full spectrum of university benefits.
Understood in this sense, diversity is compelling precisely because it promotes
each student’s present and personal interest in “equal university membership.” As
used herein, this concept builds upon the constitutionally-inflected imperative that
all students, irrespective of race, have equal educational opportunities.84 Concerns
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787 (2007) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“[Although] race should not matter; the reality is that too often it does.”).
83 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2212 (alterations added). This is not the only instance in which
Justice Kennedy exhibited concern for racial isolation, or identified diversity as a mechanism
to mitigate it. See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418 (“The attainment of a diverse student body, by
contrast, serves values beyond race alone, including enhanced classroom dialogue and the
lessening of racial isolation and stereotypes.”); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787–88
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (rejecting Chief Justice Roberts’ “all-too-unyielding insistence
that race cannot be a factor when,” for instance, school authorities are faced with the “status
quo of racial isolation in schools.”).
84 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“We come then to the question
presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even
though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal, deprive the children
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about equal educational opportunity are often associated with situations in which a
racial group is relegated to inferior educational institutions due to de jure or de facto
segregation.85 This involves an inter-institutional analysis: is the educational
opportunity at Institution A equal to that at Institution B? The concept of equal
university membership trades on this same egalitarian impulse but narrows the unit
of analysis to a single institution. The underlying inquiry, therefore, is intrainstitutional and asks whether all students within Institution A have equal access,
regardless of race, to the full benefits that accrue from membership in Institution
A.86 To concretize the stakes of un-equal university membership, I now outline the
principal benefits of university membership.
of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.”). Equal
university membership builds on existing theory such as Susan Sturm’s concept of
“institutional citizenship.” Sturm, supra note 17, at 303 (“[A]ll institutional citizens should
be able to realize their potential and participate fully in the life of the institution.” (citation
omitted)); see also Rich, supra note 16, at 1042 (“[Grutter] overlooks tokenism in which
minority students are admitted to contribute to the educational environment provided by the
university but not necessarily to receive an equal education or to benefit equally from the
education that they do receive.”); Jonathan Feingold & Doug Souza, Measuring the Racial
Unevenness of Law School, 15 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 71, 112 (2013) (describing
the concept of “racial unevenness”).
85 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 781–82 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), this Court held that segregation of
children in public schools on the basis of race deprives minority group children of equal
educational opportunities and therefore denies them the equal protection of the laws under
the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C.§ 1702(a)(1)
(2012) (“[T]he maintenance of dual school systems in which students are assigned to schools
solely on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin denies to those students the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.”). This is the formulation of
equal educational opportunity that the Supreme Court rejected in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (holding that education does not
constitute a fundamental right under the Constitution). In recently-filed litigation, fourteen
public-school students and parents in Rhode Island have made similar claims that, by
providing such inferior education, the “state has failed to fulfill its duties under the U.S.
Constitution.” See Alia Wong, The Student Suing for a Constitutional Right to Education,
THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/11/
lawsuit-constitutional-right-education/576901/ [https://perma.cc/3322-EECH].
86 The concept of equal university membership recognizes that admission and
matriculation do not guarantee equal educational opportunity. In other words, a student’s
admission into an elite institution does not, in itself, ensure that student will realize an
education therein equal to her peers. Cf. Kenneth W. Mack, The Two Modes of Inclusion,
129 HARV. L. REV. F. 290, 296 (2016) (“George McLaurin was asking to participate fully in
the life of the university. But what exactly would that mean? Would making good on that
claim require, as it would in the housing context, a fundamental alteration in the way that the
institution operated?”); Rich, supra note 16, at 1081 (“[E]ven winners are not equal winners
if they are not awarded equal opportunities.”); id. at 1087 (“[S]ocial status interacts with
organizational practices to influence opportunities for individual growth and achievement
during and after an initial moment of selection.”).
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A. The Benefits of University Membership
The principal benefits of university membership fall into at least three general
categories: learning benefits, networking benefits, and signaling benefits. 87 By
unpacking these distinct yet related benefits, one can better appreciate the layered
and intersecting consequences that flow from institutional conditions which subject
certain students to identity-contingent burdens.
1. Learning Benefits
Learning is arguably the principal benefit of university membership. It is
therefore unsurprising that learning figures prominently in the Supreme Court’s
equal protection jurisprudence. This is particularly true in cases that have implicated
the right to equal educational opportunity, which itself is embedded with concerns
about access to learning.
This focus on learning can be seen, for instance, in the Supreme Court’s
landmark desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of Education.88 To buttress the
Court’s then-controversial conclusion, Chief Justice Warren described education—
that is, learning—as “the very foundation of good citizenship . . . [and] a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.”89
Even before Brown, similar concerns had motivated the Supreme Court’s growing
condemnation of de jure segregation.90 Such concerns arose in the context of laws
that formally excluded non-Whites from certain schools (as in Brown),91 but also in
the context of institutions that imposed segregatory conditions within the
university.92 Irrespective of the specific context, the Supreme Court rebuked

This list is no doubt non-exhaustive. Nonetheless, my intent is to offer a point of
departure that explores the principal benefits of university membership and its relationship
to student body diversity.
88 347 U.S. at 493 (“In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms.”).
89 Id.
90 See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950)
(“The result is that appellant is handicapped in his pursuit of effective graduate instruction.
Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and
exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.”); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) (“The law school, the proving ground for legal learning
and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which
the law interacts.”).
91 See Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634.
92 See McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641.
87
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conditions that denied certain students, because of their race, learning opportunities
equal to their peers.93
Concerns about learning have also been featured in the Supreme Court’s
embrace of diversity as a constitutionally compelling interest.94 This includes Bakke,
when Justice Powell championed diversity and the educational benefits derivative
thereof as critical to the university’s educational mission.95 In many ways, Justice
Powell’s diversity rationale was predicated on the notion that diversity promotes,
and may be necessary for, the learning required of a great institution.96 This
sentiment, alive in Grutter and Fisher, is captured by the Supreme Court’s oftrepeated homage to “the educational benefits that flow from student body
diversity.”97
More concretely, one can understand learning as the knowledge, skills, and
training that a student acquires during her university tenure. As the Supreme Court
has noted, learning takes many forms and occurs in a variety of institutional settings,
some formal, others informal; some academic, others social.98 Formal learning
includes specific subject matter and is acquired, often, through formal instruction in
classroom settings.99 Physics students, for instance, learn about matter and its motion
and behavior through time and space. Economics students, on the other hand, learn
about capital, markets, and fiscal policy. Beyond the classroom, learning
See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.A.
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210 (2016) (“[S]tudent body diversity promotes learning
outcomes, and better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society,
and better prepares them as professionals.” (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330
(2003) (emphasis added))).
95 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312–13 (1978) (“The
atmosphere of ‘speculation, experiment and creation’—so essential to the quality of higher
education—is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body. As the Court noted
in Keyishian, it is not too much to say that the ‘nation’s future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many
peoples.” (citation omitted)).
96 See id. at 312 n.48 (“[Learning] occurs through interactions among students of both
sexes; of different races, religions, and backgrounds; who come from cities and rural areas,
from various states and countries; who have a wide variety of interests, talents, and
perspectives; and who are able, directly or indirectly, to learn from their differences and to
stimulate one another to reexamine even their most deeply held assumptions about
themselves and their world. As a wise graduate of ours observed in commenting on this
aspect of the educational process, ‘People do not learn very much when they are surrounded
only by the likes of themselves.’”).
97 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210 (emphasis added).
98 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312–13 n.48 (“[A] great deal of learning occurs
informally. . . . In the nature of things, it is hard to know how, and when, and even if, this
informal ‘learning through diversity’ actually occurs. It does not occur for everyone. For
many, however, the unplanned, casual encounters with roommates, fellow sufferers in an
organic chemistry class, student workers in the library, teammates on a basketball squad, or
other participants in class affairs or student government can be subtle and yet powerful
sources of improved understanding and personal growth.” (citation omitted)).
99 See id.
93
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opportunities arise across varied sites, from dorm rooms and cafeterias, to
organizational meetings and extracurricular events.100
Learning confers intrinsic and extrinsic benefits.101 Intrinsically, I refer
principally to the innate value of acquiring new knowledge: one gains the ability to
see the world in a new, more precise, complicated, troubled, and nuanced way.
Extrinsically, the acquisition of new knowledge and skills better positions one to
solve a problem, decipher a previously unanswered question, or access higher levels
of academic or professional achievement. Beyond the individual, learning enables
students to benefit future employers and, ultimately, contribute to society writ
large.102 The Supreme Court has celebrated this dimension of learning in cases that
range from Brown and Sweatt,103 to Bakke and Grutter.104
This Article is not intended to diminish the normative or doctrinal appeal of
institutional efforts—including admissions policies—that promote learning in the
university. To the contrary, concerns about unequal learning opportunities are
rightly featured in Brown, which arguably remains the Supreme Court’s most
celebrated equal protection opinion. Yet in the context of affirmative action, the
Supreme Court has yet to meaningfully link diversity to the goal of equal learning
opportunities within the university.
Whatever the educational opportunities available within a given university,
equal membership concerns exist if, as a function of race, these opportunities do not
flow evenly to all students. One can begin to see how such concerns might inform
existing equal protection doctrine. Given a university’s compelling interest to
promote educational benefits therein (via diversity),105 one could argue that the
university has just as great, if not greater, an interest to ensure that all students,
See id.
Although precise line drawing between what is extrinsic and what is intrinsic
presents its own challenges, this dichotomy offers a useful heuristic for appreciating distinct
learning benefits. See generally Patrick S. Shin, Diversity v. Colorblindness, 2009 BYU L.
REV. 1175, 1183 (2009) (“Something is intrinsically valuable if it is valuable simply in itself,
regardless of its relation to anything else that might be valuable. To say that something has
intrinsic value is to say that its value or goodness does not depend on external conditions and
so is in that sense unconditionally good, or that we always have reason to want it to exist. In
contrast, something is extrinsically valuable if its value depends on conditions external to it,
such as the condition of being causally related to a particular consequence, or the condition
of being regarded as valuable by a particular person.” (citations omitted)).
102 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (“We have repeatedly
acknowledged the overriding importance of preparing students for work and citizenship,
describing education as pivotal to ‘sustaining our political and cultural heritage’ with a
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of society.” (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
221 (1982)).
103 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629,
634 (1950).
104 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331–32; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312
n.48 (1978).
105 This describes the diversity rationale as it exists under prevailing doctrine. See
generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
100
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regardless of race, can access those benefits. Student body diversity, it turns out,
promotes both ends.106
2. Networking Benefits
A second benefit of university membership is “networking,” a term I employ
to capture a student’s social engagements and relationship-building within the
university.107 As with learning, concerns about networking surfaced within the
Supreme Court’s pre-Brown de-segregation jurisprudence. One can understand the
Court’s decision in Sweatt, for instance, as resting on the inequitable networking
opportunities available to African American students excluded from the University
of Texas Law School.108 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court specifically
cited this deficiency to support its conclusion that the education offered to African
Americans was unequal to that available to their white peers.109
From the university student’s perspective, networking occurs along at least
three primary planes: (1) student to student; (2) student to staff and faculty;
(3) student to alumni. Across each plane, networking has the potential to confer
short- and long-term benefits. In the short term, meaningful relationships can imbue
students with a greater sense of social belonging, which itself can produce positive
feedback loops and buffer students against negative recursive processes.110 An
enhanced sense of social belonging, in turn, builds institutional trust and increases a

See infra Part II.B.
See generally Per Davidsson & Benson Honig, The Role of Social and Human
Capital Among Nascent Entrepreneurs, 18 J. BUS. VENTURING 301, 307 (2003) (“[Social
capital is] provided by extended family, community-based, or organizational relationships
[and] are theorized to supplement the effects of education, experience and financial
capital.”); see also Cindy A. Schipani et al., Pathways for Women to Obtain Positions of
Organizational Leadership: The Significance of Mentoring and Networking, 16 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 89, 103 (2009).
108 See Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634 (“The law school to which Texas is willing to admit
petitioner excludes from its student body members of the racial groups which number 85%
of the population of the State and include most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and
other officials with whom petitioner will inevitably be dealing when he becomes a member
of the Texas Bar. With such a substantial and significant segment of society excluded, we
cannot conclude that the education offered petitioner is substantially equal to that which he
would receive if admitted to the University of Texas Law School.”).
109 Id.
110 See infra Section II.B.2.a; see also Dorainne Green et al., Relationship Inequalities
in Law School at 2 (working paper) (on file with author and Utah Law Review) (reviewing
research that found “law students from stigmatized backgrounds (e.g., racial/ethnic
minorities) report having weaker social relationships in law school . . . [which] predicted
lower sense of belonging[,] . . . reduced satisfaction with their law school experience, and
lower grades in law school”).
106
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student’s broader social and academic engagement—all of which better position a
student to reach her full potential, academic and otherwise, within the university and
beyond.111
Positive inter-personal relationships offer additional benefits. Relationships
with institutional insiders—often in the form of formal or informal mentors—offer
access to insider knowledge that can facilitate successful navigation of an
institution’s social and academic domains.112 Mentors can also become a place of
refuge, particularly for students who might otherwise feel out of place, unwelcome,
or under-valued in the university. Often, quality mentor relationships prove critical
to one’s present and future success.113 Relationships born within the university can
bear future fruit in the form of more advanced academic and professional
opportunities down the road.114 Whether in the form of a letter of reference or an
unsolicited notice about a job opening, personal and organizational relationships
often prove invaluable long after graduation.115
In contexts that include yet transcend higher education, quality networking will
be most valuable to students who, relative to their peers, lack preexisting
relationships within the subject profession or industry.116 Given histories of
exclusion and contemporary segregation in the United States,117 this unevenness will
often have a racially disparate impact. Accordingly, when institutional conditions
See infra Section II.B.2.a.
On the value of diverse mentoring networks, see Meera E. Deo & Kimberly A.
Griffin, The Social Capital Benefits of Peer-Mentoring Relationships in Law School, 38
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 305, 313, 330 (2011); see also Leary Davis, Building Legal Talent:
Mentors, Coaches, Preceptors and Gurus in the Legal Profession, 20 PROF. LAW. 12, 12
(2011) (“These traditional mentoring relationships occur spontaneously and informally.
They tend to be long-lasting, based on mutual respect, personal friendship and, more often
than not, shared values. Mentors are attracted to protégés because of their personalities and
their apparent skill.”).
113 See David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in
Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 493, 540 (1996).
114 See James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J.
SOC. S95, S100–01 (1988).
115 See Terry Morehead Dworkin et al., The Role of Networks, Mentors, and the Law in
Overcoming Barriers to Organizational Leadership for Women with Children, 20 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 83, 103–04 (2013) (“The findings showed ‘that female managers can miss out
on global appointments because they lack mentors, role models, sponsorship, or access to
appropriate networks—all of which are commonly available to their male counterparts.’”
(citation omitted)); see also Bo Han, Mentoring Policies to Increase Women’s Participation
in Commercial Science, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 437 (2009) (“Ties with the
right people, in the right configuration, may increase an individual’s access to organizational
influence and career mobility.”).
116 Id.
117 Christopher Ingraham, Three Quarters of Whites Don’t Have any Non-White
Friends, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Aug. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2014/08/25/three-quarters-of-whites-dont-have-any-non-white-friends/?utm_term
=.9e5463614829 [https://perma.cc/D5MX-VD2X].
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hinder the ability of students from historically underrepresented groups to take full
advantage of institutional networks, the resulting harm could be two-fold. First, the
student suffers personally; she is deprived a resource available to her classmates.
Second, to the extent that initial deprivation excludes the student from the relevant
market, the institution’s failure to provide equal access to networks will itself
reinforce and perpetuate (if not exacerbate) historical inequities within the relevant
industry or domain.
3. Signaling Benefits
A third and distinct benefit derived from university membership is “signaling.”
Most broadly, the term “signaling” can be understood as the meaning communicated
by a given proxy.118 For purposes of this Article, I am most interested in the meaning
communicated by a student’s academic record—that is, a student’s academic
signaling. Academic signaling, which bears significant consequences, arguably
begins with the institution a student attends.119 Prospective employers, for instance,
often view an applicant’s alma mater as a proxy for valued professional
characteristics.120 Students accordingly benefit from (or are disadvantaged by) their
school’s relative reputation and prestige.
Academic signaling does not, however, end with the university an individual
attends. In most cases, academic signaling also turns on a student’s academic
performance (e.g., grades, awards, or other academic accolades), activities (e.g.,
intercollegiate athletics or student organizations), and university service (e.g.,

118 For a discussion on signaling in employment settings, see Devon W. Carbado &
Mitu Gulati, The Economics of Race and Gender: Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REV.
103, 113 (2000).
119 Educational entities, from pre-kindergarten through professional schools, represent
stops on a track to greater opportunity, power, and privilege. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 332 (2003) (“[U]niversities, and in particular, law schools, represent the training
ground for a large number of our Nation’s leaders. Individuals with law degrees occupy
roughly half the state governorships, more than half the seats in the United States Senate,
and more than a third of the seats in the United States House of Representatives . . . . A
handful of these schools accounts for 25 of the 100 United States Senators, 74 United States
Courts of Appeals judges, and nearly 200 of the more than 600 United States District Court
judges.” (citations omitted)).
120 Consider, for example, two law students who both graduated with a 3.6 GPA, one
from Harvard Law School, the other from a third-tier institution. If the employer knows
nothing else about the applicants, it will likely conclude that the student from Harvard (a
“prestigious” institution) is more likely to possess the characteristics need to be a successful
lawyer. Cf. Feingold & Souza, supra note 84, at 95 (noting that prestigious federal appellate
court clerkships, along with providing invaluable work experience, provide an additional
benefit—access to more coveted prizes and positions—in a way that a less prestigious
clerkship (or no clerkship) does not). This example is not meant to treat the use of proxies
as uncontestable, but rather to describe their common use.
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student government).121 Each piece of a student’s academic record, and the record
as a whole, tells a story about the student’s personal character and her academic and
professional talent and potential.
In most contexts, academic performance will carry greater weight than other
portions of the academic record. A student’s academic performance, in turn, carries
pronounced short and long-term consequences. In the short-term, academic underperformance122 might inaccurately signal (to the student and others) that a student
lacks what it takes to succeed in a given domain. This can erode a student’s
confidence and sense of belonging, confirm doubts about one’s “fit,” and foster
withdrawal or disengagement within the relevant discipline or domain.123 It may also
lead university faculty or staff to encourage the student to explore a different area of
study.
Signaling, as a function of academic performance, also impacts future academic
and professional opportunities inside the university and beyond.124 Grades are often
viewed as powerful proxies about intellectual ability and potential. Within the
university, entry-level classes can function as gateways to more advanced courses
and subject matter. Even if a student is otherwise capable, academic underperformance (and the signal it communicates) early in a student’s academic career
can compromise the student’s ability to proceed vertically through a given discipline
or area of study.125 Beyond the university, employers and graduate or professional
programs commonly rely on GPA (among other metrics of academic achievement)
to gauge academic and professional talent and potential. Succeed—relative to your
peers—and increase your chances of advancing. Fail to do so, and your chances
accordingly dwindle.
Standard articulations of diversity and its educational benefits rarely account
for signaling. This makes sense given that such articulations rarely account for the
identify-contingent headwinds that students of color confront when severely
underrepresented in predominately white institutions. Academic performance, good
Irrespective of the student’s success therein, a powerful signal comes from the
institution itself.
122 By under-performance, I mean that environmental factors undermined the student’s
ability to perform up to her ability. Had those environmental factors been removed, the
student’s performance would have improved and offered a more accurate reflection of her
existing talent and potential. This notion of under-performance is consistent with, and
reflects findings from, the stereotype threat literature. See Walton & Spencer, infra note 193,
at 1137.
123 See Yeager et al., supra note 3, at E3342.
124 See Feingold & Souza, supra note 84, at 95 (“Beyond signaling talent or merit to
future employers, first-semester and first-year grades indicate to students whether law school
was the proper choice, the proper fit, and whether ‘I belong here.’”).
125 How an institution or student interprets underperformance may trade on socially
salient attitudes and stereotypes concerning that student’s “fit” in a given domain. See
Jonathan P. Feingold & Evelyn R. Carter, Eyes Wide Open: What Social Science Can Tell
Us About the Supreme Court’s Use of Social Science, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1689, 1707–10
(2018) (describing how an “Elite Student Paradigm” centers whiteness and imagines students
of color—particularly Black students—as perpetual university outsiders).
121
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or bad, is presumed to accurately reflect a student’s talent and potential.126 Little
attention is paid to the way in which institutional environments—including racial
demographics—may uniquely impact students from negatively stereotyped groups,
and thereby result in grades that under-state a student’s existing ability.127
The failure to link diversity with academic performance was hardly inevitable.
From Bakke through Fisher II, Justices sewed their opinions with the insight of
university administrators who themselves expressed concern about the race-based
harms associated with racial tokenism.128 If one accepts such observations, it would
be odd to conclude that such headwinds never impact academic performance (and,
by extension, a student’s ability to signal their full talent and potential). To the
contrary, in a setting characterized by unequal headwinds, academic performance
will likely under-signal the actual talent and ability of underrepresented students.
Their unburdened peers, in contrast, reap a relative and unearned signaling boost.129
Ultimately, some may view signaling as an odd category to include within a
taxonomy of university benefits. I do so for two reasons. First, as discussed above,
signaling carries tremendous practical consequences. Even if academic performance
cannot guarantee future success, many a door are unlikely to open unless one enters
a prestigious institution and succeeds therein. Second, as I discuss in greater detail
in Part III, signaling warrants attention because it taps into values that continue to
inform the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. For over four decades,
the Supreme Court has viewed with skepticism selection processes that compromise
an individual’s ability to compete for public benefits on the basis of individual merit,
regardless of one’s race.130 When institutional conditions exact race-dependent
burdens on certain students, those students are deprived of such an opportunity. In
other words, when one defends diversity as a mechanism to mitigate harms that
contravene basic commitments to individual meritocracy, race-conscious
admissions emerge as a tool to promote values that a majority of Supreme Court
Justices—including those traditionally hostile to affirmative action—continue to
locate at the core of equal protection.131

126 See Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When Title VI Trumps State AntiAffirmative Action Laws, 157 U. PA. L. Rev. 1075, 1109–13 (2009) (discussing the
distinction between “minority deficiency” and “test deficiency” theories of
underperformance).
127 See infra Section II.B.2.b (discussing findings on stereotype threat).
128 See supra Sections I.A–C.
129 See Feingold, Racing Towards Color-blindness, supra note 47; infra Section
II.B.2.b.
130 See Jonathan P. Feingold, Equal Protection Design Defects, 91 TEMP. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (arguing that equal protection doctrine has been designed to further each
individual’s “right to compete” on the basis of individual “merit,” regardless of a person’s
race) [hereinafter Feingold, Equal Protection].
131 See supra Part III.C.
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4. Intersecting and Interacting Benefits
This brief overview of learning, networking, and signaling benefits is not meant
to be comprehensive of the varied benefits that flow from university membership.
Nonetheless, by unpacking these components of university membership, this brief
exposition helps to illuminate the discrete and reinforcing harms that may arise when
institutional conditions subject certain students to identity-contingent harms. When
a student faces racial isolation on campus, or confronts negative stereotypes in the
classroom, the impact is not limited to the emotional or physical toll of the
experience itself.132 There is also the threat that the harm compounds by interfering
with the student’s ability to learn, to engage, and to perform.
But it is not just that learning, networking, or signaling may suffer. These
dimensions of university membership are inherently intertwined; conditions that
impact one will likely compromise others as well.133 Consider a scenario in which
institutional conditions undermine a student’s ability to learn. To the extent learning
suffers, that hit will likely impact the student’s academic performance. The student’s
academic performance, in turn, translates into a grade (or grades) that under-state(s)
that student’s actual academic talent and potential. Thus, even though learning and
signaling may be analytically distinct, when institutional conditions compromise
one, it will often be difficult to quarantine that harm from the other.
I am not suggesting, however, that there is always a direct relationship between
learning, networking, and signaling. One could imagine a different scenario in which
institutional conditions (e.g., pervasive racial stereotypes) cause a student to
academically disengage (e.g., by electing not to speak in class or attend office
hours).134 Due to this academic disengagement, the student’s learning (that derived
from active participation in the classroom and office hours) would likely suffer. The
student may nonetheless excel academically and receive a top grade in the class.
Under this scenario, the hit to learning has not compromised the student’s academic
performance; signaling attributable to that grade is, accordingly, unaffected. In fact,
See Mary C. Murphy et al., Cognitive Costs of Contemporary Prejudice, 16 GROUP
PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELATIONS 560, 564–69 (2012) (discussing results of separate
studies that suggest exposure to racial prejudice disrupts racial minorities’ cognition).
133 See Greene et al., supra note 110, at 25 (describing the relationship between
“stigmatized” law students’ relationships in law school, sense of belonging, law school
satisfaction, and academic achievement). The Supreme Court appreciates the overlapping
relationship between learning and networking. Across multiple contexts, the Supreme Court
has emphasized that learning arises, in part, from a student’s engagement with those from
different backgrounds and experiences. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 312 n.48 (1978); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 641
(1950). One could imagine this interdependency as follows (or in the negative): Networking
promotes learning (social disengagement undermines learning); learning promotes signaling
(failure to learn undermines academic performance which entails negative signaling);
signaling promotes learning and networking (poor academic performance reinforces feelings
of nonbelonging). Rinse and repeat.
134 See UCLA Law Students Brief, supra note 2, at 19–28 (describing how
underrepresentation can create environments that dissuade students from speaking in class).
132
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the student’s academic performance may mask what have become silent harms that
nonetheless bear independent learning or networking costs.135 And beyond the
individual student, when environmental conditions chill the speech of underrepresented students (or otherwise minority perspectives), classroom discussion
suffers—and so does the learning of other students in the class.
To further concretize the relationship between diversity and equal university
membership, I now bridge the theory to student testimony and social science.
Collectively, the personal accounts and empirical scholarship reinforce the same
basic insight: racial diversity matters, in part, because severe underrepresentation
can exact race-contingent burdens that undermine a student’s ability to access the
full benefits of university membership.
B. Linking Diversity and Personal Equality
1. The Student Perspective
As Part I revealed, university administrators understand that students of color,
absent a racially diversity student body, face unique burdens within the university.
Administrators are not alone in this assessment. Students also appreciate the
potentially deleterious impact of severe underrepresentation. However, unlike
university administrators, students and their voices remain largely absent from the
Supreme Court’s discussion of diversity and its educational benefits. As a result, the
Supreme Court continues to overlook some of the individuals best positioned to
describe the challenges that befall underrepresented students of color on
predominately white campuses.
This omission is not the result of silent students. To the contrary, students have
long been on the frontlines to preserve affirmative action and to resist the resegregation of American institutions. One notable example comes from the UCLA
School of Law Students of Color amicus brief submitted in Grutter.136 As the
students attested, they were uniquely positioned to “comment on [Grutter] because
See Ingroup Experts, supra note 20, at 232 (“[S]ometimes people lack confidence
in their ability and withdraw from achievement domains even when their performance is as
good as their peers. In other words, performance and self-efficacy don’t always go hand in
hand.”).
136 See UCLA Law Students Brief, supra note 2. This brief was submitted by a coalition
of law students and alumni of the University of California school system, including
testimonials of students from Boalt Hall, Hastings College of Law, UCLA School of Law,
and UC Davis School of Law. Id. at *19–28. In the roughly 15 years since this brief was
submitted, UCLA undergraduate and law students have continued to document the
deleterious effects of underrepresentation in a post-affirmative action state. See also, e.g.,
Feingold & Souza, supra note 84, at 112–14; RecordtoCapture, 33, YOUTUBE (Feb. 10,
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5y3C5KBcCPI [https://perma.cc/6E59-4DG9];
Sy Stokes, The Black Bruins [Spoken Word], YOUTUBE (Nov. 4, 2013)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=16&v=BEO3H5BOlFk [https://perma.cc/
37RR-7CL6].
135
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they ha[d] been directly affected by the prohibition against affirmative action in the
UC system.”137 Their amicus brief drew on more than ten declarations and was
signed by hundreds of students across four University of California law schools.138
Through their individual and collective testimony, the students detailed the burdens
that law students of color confronted following the passage of Proposition 209, a
statewide ballot initiative that effectively banned affirmative action in California.139
Notwithstanding the students’ admission to elite UC law schools under a “postaffirmative action” regime, the severe underrepresentation and quasi-segregation
they experienced exacted concrete and racially-inflected harms. The following
accounts are illustrative:
The worst thing about not having other Latinos in my classes is that I am
expected to be the voice for “my people.” Every time I manage to work up
the courage to speak, whatever I say is taken to be the opinion of all
Latinos in the United States. I know that I am alone and would not have
any allies in my positions and statements. Therefore, I often just sit in class
and swallow my thoughts.
– Rosa Figueroa-Versage, UC Hastings, Class of 2003140
I am one of 13 Black students, and am often the only Black student that my
non-Black peers come into contact with on a daily basis . . . . While other
students are free to say whatever they like, I am constantly forced to think
through and then re-think my comments before speaking to eliminate
anything that can be characterized as resulting from my Blackness. This
is a hard burden to bear. The only people who can identify with my
struggles are my fellow Black students. However, because of our small
numbers and the toll that repeated “war stories” can place on them, I
often have to shoulder the burden alone.
–Tiffany Renee Thomas, Boalt Hall, Class of 2005141
One day I was approached in the law school courtyard by a couple of
UCLA campus police officers . . . . Apparently, since I’m one of the only
Black males walking around this school, this was enough for the officer to
say affirmatively that I was the male [another student] had identified . . . .
Once the officers realized that I was a law student, they didn’t even bother
to ask me any questions about the alleged theft. However, from my
perspective, the damage was already done . . . . I had been trying hard to
fit in with the rest of my classmates and to get them to see me as more than
just “the Black man in the class.” I was so emotionally distraught that I
UCLA Law Students Brief, supra note 2, at *1.
Id. at *19–28.
139 Id. at *2.
140 Id. at *21.
141 Id. at *27–28.
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was not even able to go to class that day. It will be a long time before I am
ever comfortable in the law school environment again.
– Marky Keaton, UCLA School of Law, Class of 2003142
Because of the lack of students of color in the classroom . . . the decision
to raise my hand and speak out is not one easily made. I choose to speak,
but only because the obligation I feel to those who fought before me . . .
outweighs my fear of being ridiculed by my peers . . . . I suffer through
Property class virtually alone as I wait for the professor to mention, just
once, where all this “property” that we have so many laws about comes
from. When I bring up the fact that the law of adverse possession that
focuses on “efficient” use of the land is based on a particular Anglo
conception of efficiency, the same concept of efficiency that often served
as the colonial justification for forced appropriation of Indian lands, I am
faced with a moment of silence and then, moving on . . . . My contribution
has been effectively devalued and I am silenced for the remainder of the
day.
The only support network I find is from the few students of color in the
first-year class. We share battle stories from the classroom and console
one another in our anger and pain at the silence that is imposed on us by
virtue of the fact that our numbers are not significant enough to render
our issues “important” in the classroom.
– Angela Mooney-D’arcy, UCLA School of Law, Class of 2004143
I do not present this testimony as dispositive proof that students of color suffer
race-based harms when universities lack racial diversity. Nonetheless, the accounts
offer valuable, personalized insight that should inform contemporary conversations
about the relationship between diversity and equality. The foregoing anecdotes
illuminate, for instance, the multifaceted toll that students of color experience when
severely underrepresented in the classroom. Although each student’s experience was
unique, the testimony exposes common themes of racial isolation, racial identity
salience, stigma-consciousness, emotional fatigue, and perpetual outsider status.144
The fact that this testimony comes from elite California law schools in a postaffirmative action context renders the stories particularly relevant for ongoing

Id. at *24.
Id. at *22.
144 UCLA Law Students Brief, supra note 2, at *19–28; see also Feingold & Souza,
supra note 84, at 88; Elizabeth Pinel et al., Getting There Is Only Half the Battle: Stigma
Consciousness and Maintaining Diversity in Higher Education, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 481, 482
(2005). Beyond adding texture to what can often be an abstract and face-less conversation
about diversity, I include these statements to center and uplift the voices of actual students
who, following the abolition of affirmative action, faced conditions that compromised an
equal university membership. It is also worth noting where the students found refuge: in
spaces with other students who understood the toll of severe racial underrepresentation.
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litigation that implicates the future of race-conscious admissions nationwide.145
They also counter lay theories that identify race-conscious admissions as the source
of racial stigma or presumptions of non-belonging that students of color face in elite
institutions.146
Ultimately, these anecdotes occupy one piece of a broader mosaic of evidence
concerning the relationship between racial demographics and a university’s ability
to realize an equal university membership for all students. Another piece of this
story, to which I now turn, comes from two related bodies of scholarship which
further fortify the case for diversity by empirically anchoring the theory and personal
testimony to social science.
2. The Social Science
Over the past decade, legal scholars have drawn heavily on implicit bias
scholarship to disrupt assumptions about discrimination and human behavior
embedded in legal doctrine.147 Aspects of the implicit bias research, particularly that
concerning the debiasing potential of intergroup contact and counter-typical
exemplars, are relevant to debates about diversity’s function as a driver of
equality.148 At the same time, the implicit bias literature offers limited value with
respect to the central empirical claim underlying this Article: that severe
underrepresentation can exact identity-contingent harms that compromise a
student’s ability to learn, engage, and perform.149
Fortunately, distinct bodies of empirical scholarship speak directly to this
claim. I refer specifically to research on the related psychological phenomena of
social identity threat and stereotype threat.150 The social science reveals that
irrespective of an institution’s egalitarian commitments, when environmental
features—including racial demographics—signal that certain students will be
See supra note 10 (identifying existing lawsuits challenging the race-conscious
admissions policies at Harvard and UNC-Chapel Hill).
146 See Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social
Experiment Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197, 1199 (2010) (describing a study
that found that “[u]nderrepresented minority students in states that permit affirmative action
encounter far less hostility and internal and external stigma than students in anti-affirmative
action states”).
147 See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1495–97
(2005). An August 27, 2018 Westlaw search for “implicit bias” identified 2,735 law review
articles. Searches for “stereotype threat” and “social identity threat” identified 596 article
and 52 articles, respectively.
148 See, e.g., See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing Is Believing: Exposure to
Counterstereotypic Women Leaders and Its Effect on the Malleability of Automatic Gender
Stereotyping, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 642, 649–54 (2004) (observing a decrease
of implicit bias against women in a cohort of female students after one year in a single-sex
university).
149 See infra Part II.B.2.a–b (discussing the effects of stereotype threat and social
identity threat).
150 See id.
145
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devalued or negatively stereotyped because of their race, those students encounter
unique, race-based headwinds that can interfere with learning, decrease rates of
academic and social engagement, and undermine academic performance.151
(a) Social Identity Threat
Many students experience social belonging doubts when transitioning to new
environments such as college.152 For students from negatively stereotyped groups,
this general concern can be heightened by the particular anxiety that they will be
devalued or negatively stereotyped because of their identity.153 That is, they
experience what social psychologists have termed “social identity threat,” which
captures the “broad threat that people experience when they believe they may be
treated negatively or devalued in a setting simply because of a particular social
identity they hold.”154
Professor David Yeager and colleagues have explained that “worries about
belonging and potential are pernicious precisely because they arise from awareness
of real social disadvantage before and during college, including . . . awareness of

151 See Ingroup Experts, supra note 20, at 232 (“Stereotype threat and social identity
threat are known to undermine performance in domains where one’s group is negatively
stereotyped and one’s belonging uncertain; over time, weak performance reduces selfconfidence in one’s ability (or self-efficacy) and leads individuals to withdraw from the
domain.”). This literature does not stand for the proposition, nor am I arguing, that racial
diversity can itself eliminate racial unevenness in the university. Still, racial diversity
constitutes one piece of a broader constellation of factors that predict whether students of
color will face race-dependent burdens within educational environments. See generally
Deirdre Bowen, American Skin: Dispensing with Colorblindness and Critical Mass in
Affirmative Action, 73 PITT. L. REV. 339 (2011) (arguing that numerical representation might
be insufficient to reduce racial stigma under a regime of rhetorical colorblindness); Sam
Erman & Gregory M. Walton, Stereotype Threat and Antidiscrimination Law: Affirmative
Steps to Promote Meritocracy and Racial Equality in Education, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 307,
330–39 (2015) (reviewing interventions shown to reduce threat). It would be just as
shortsighted to claim that individual bad actors are the lone threat to equality. Cf. Shelby v.
Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 565 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing a compilation of
legislative records that documented “countless examples of flagrant racial discrimination
since the last reauthorization; . . . systematic evidence that intentional racial discrimination
in voting remains so serious and widespread in covered jurisdictions that section 5
preclearance is still needed” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
152 See Greg M. Walton & Geoffrey L. Cohen, A Brief Social-Belonging Intervention
Improves Academic and Health Outcomes of Minority Students, 331 SCI. 1447, 1448 (2011)
(explaining “[d]uring the transition to a new school, students can face frequent social
setbacks and feelings of isolation.”).
153 See Yeager et al., supra note 3, at E3347 (noting social identity threat is not limited
to individuals from negatively stereotyped racial groups, but has also been shown to impact
women and first-generation college students, regardless of race).
154 Mary C. Murphy et al., Signaling Threat, 18 PSCHOL. SCI. 879, 879 (2007).
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negative stereotypes and numeric underrepresentation.”155 These identity-inflected
worries can trigger doubts about whether “people like them fully belong,” whether
they “will be seen as lacking intelligence,” and whether they “will be a poor cultural
fit.”156 These particularized belonging concerns can “seed harmful inferences for
even commonplace challenges . . . such as feelings of loneliness, academic struggles,
or critical feedback.”157 As a result, students can perceive negative—but arguably
minor—events as evidence that they do not belong more fundamentally.158 These
inferences, in turn, can “sap motivation and undermine achievement through a cycle
that gains strength through its repetition.”159
A pernicious cycle results.160 A negative event confirms anxieties about nonbelonging, which can cause even highly motivated and talented students to
disengage or withdraw from the relevant domain.161 Disengagement increases the
likelihood of future academic underachievement, which reaffirms doubts about
belonging and precipitates further withdrawal and disengagement.162
Although pervasive, social identity threat is not an inevitable feature of
university life. To the contrary, this psychological threat is environmentally
contingent, meaning that its presence and severity turns on situational cues that
signal whether an individual’s identity is stigmatized within a particular setting.163
155 Yeager et al., supra note 3, at E3347; see also Valeria Purdie-Vaughns et al., Social
Identity Contingencies: How Diversity Cues Signal Threat or Safety for African Americans
in Mainstream Institutions, 94 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 615, 616 (2008) (“People who
belong to stigmatized groups may question whether their group is valued in mainstream
settings (e.g., workplaces, schools, religious settings), especially in ones in which their group
has been historically discriminated against or stereotyped.”).
156 Yeager et al., supra note 3, at E3342 (noting students from nonstereotyped groups—
even if they experience general anxiety about entering college—do not confront these
particularized anxieties moored to more fundamental identity-contingent doubts about
belonging).
157 Id. at E3342. Recall that loneliness and isolation were two concerns that Kennedy
explicitly named in Fisher II. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2212 (2016) (“In addition to this
broad demographic data, the University put forward evidence that minority students admitted
under the Hopwood regime experienced feelings of loneliness and isolation.”).
158 Yeager et al., supra note 3, at E3348.
159 Id. at E3342.
160 Id. at E3342 fig.1.
161 See generally Murphy et al., supra note 154, at 880–84 (supporting the proposition
that “threatening features of a setting . . . may cause even highly confident, highly domainidentified women to avoid or leave MSE fields”).
162 See id. at 879 (noting many stereotype-threat researchers “have argued that targets’
reduced psychic resources . . . render them vulnerable to deficits in performance when they
experience stereotype threat”).
163 See id. at 879–80 (“[W]e contend that a person’s vulnerability to identity threat need
not be inherent to him or her. Instead, situational cues may contribute to experiences of social
identity threat among groups potentially stereotyped in a setting—even when targets are
interested, confident, proven achievers in the relevant domain.”); see also Purdie-Vaughns
et al., supra note 155, at 616 (“[G]roup members draw information from situational cues that
hold relevance for the value and the status accorded to their group.”); Ingroup Experts, supra
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Although at times overt, cues are often subtle. This can extend to an entity’s racial
or gender demographics.164 When women or people of color, for example, are visibly
under-represented within an institution, this environmental feature can itself signal
that group membership negatively implicates an individual’s present and future
opportunities and success.165 In contrast, when institutional conditions lift threat,
students are freed from this identity-contingent burden and, like their nonstereotyped peers, become positioned to experience positive feedback loops.166

note 20, at 232–33 (“Collectively, these examples suggest that the experience of being a
numeric minority in high-stakes achievement environments where stereotypes are in the air
may reduce individuals’ self-efficacy or confidence in their own ability, especially in the
face of difficulty, even if their actual performance is objectively the same as majority-groups
members.”). Institutional ideologies—such as organizational theories of intelligence or
commitments to race-conscious or colorblind discourse—also function as situational cues.
See, e.g., Evan P. Apfelbaum et al., Racial Color Blindness: Emergence, Practice, and
Implications, 21 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 205, 206 (2012) (“[A] color-blind
ideology not only has the potential to impair smooth interracial interactions but can also
facilitate—and be used to justify—racial resentment.”).
164 See generally Purdie-Vaughns et al., supra note 155, 615–18 (describing the ways
in which low minority representation cues can lead to minority populations perceiving
identity contingencies and distrusting the setting); see also Michael Inzlicht & Talia BenZeev, A Threatening Intellectual Environment, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 365, 370 (2000) (“The data
from the current study support the conclusion that the presence of males constitutes a
threatening intellectual environment for females performing a math task, and specifically
that women experience a greater deficit in their math performance the more males there are
in the environment.”); Michael Inzlicht & Catherine Good, How Environments Can Threaten
Academic Performance, Self-Knowledge, and Sense of Belonging, in STIGMA AND GROUP
INEQUALITY: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 3 (Shana Levin & Colette van Laar
eds. 2006) (noting different settings where racial and gender demographics cue a threatening
environment). Contemporary social identity threat literature builds on prior research that
observed the relationship between gender representation and threat. See Elizabeth Chambliss
& Christopher Uggen, Men and Women of Elite Law Firms: Reevaluating Kanter’s Legacy,
25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 41, 43–48 (2000); Rosabeth M. Kanter, Some Effects of Proportions
on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses to Token Women, 82 AM. J. SOC. 965, 966–
67 (1977); Eve Spangler et al., Token Women: An Empirical Test of Kanter’s Hypothesis, 84
AM. J. SOC. 160, 162 (1978).
165 See Katherine T.U. Emerson & Mary C. Murphy, A Company I Can Trust?
Organizational Lay Theories Moderate Stereotype Threat for Women, 41 (2) PERS. & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 295, 296 (2015) (“[C]ompany settings may contain powerful cues that do
not explicitly reference gender stereotypes and differences but nonetheless communicate
messages about the value of groups, thereby creating different psychological experiences for
stigmatized and nonstigmatized groups.”).
166 Id. at 295 (“[W]hen cues signal that group membership will not impede peoples’
performance or mobility, stereotype threat is tempered.”); see generally Gregory Walton &
Geoffrey Cohen, A Question of Belonging: Race, Social Fit, and Achievement, 92 J. PERS. &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 82, 94 (2007) (discussing intervention shown to decrease belonging
uncertainty and increase academic performance in Black college students).

2019]

HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT

93

These alternative recursive processes are depicted in the following
schematic:167

Given the observed relationship between numerical representation and social
identity threat, the vicious cycle depicted in the above schematic has the potential to
exact a double harm on students of color.168 To the extent students of color
experience social identity threat because an educational environment lacks racial
diversity, some students from negatively stereotyped groups are likely to withdraw
from those domains. For those students of color who remain in the relevant domain,
they must contend with an increasingly homogenous environment that may present
increasingly acute levels of threat. This double harm makes it even more incumbent
upon the university to ensure that whatever societal realities it inherits, it does not
institutionalize conditions that disproportionately burden already underrepresented
students of color. There is also a flip side to this double harm. Students from nonstereotyped groups, who never encounter racially-contingent psychological threats,
accrue a corresponding and ever-increasing racial preference as their negatively
stereotyped peers suffer.169

Yeager et al., supra note 3, at E3342 fig.1 (“Theoretical model: the process through
which lay theories affect disadvantaged students’ behavior and academic outcomes across
the transition to college.”).
168 See Charles R. Calleros, Patching Leaks in the Diversity Pipeline to Law School and
the Bar, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 131, 133–34 (2006); Michael A. Olivas, Law School Admissions
After Grutter: Student Bodies, Pipeline Theory, and the River, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 16, 17
(2005).
169 See Yeager et al., supra note 3, at E3342.
167
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(b) Stereotype Threat
Stereotype threat, which has become one of the most widely studied phenomena
in social psychology, comprises a particular manifestation of social identity threat.170
Although relatively foreign to legal scholarship, stereotype threat research has
drawn increased attention in the affirmative action context, both in the law reviews
and in actual litigation.171 Most recently, the Fisher litigation saw amicus briefs from
the nation’s leading experts on stereotype threat.172 The social scientists did not
employ the terminology of “equal university membership,” but nonetheless
harnessed the stereotype threat research to advance the same basic argument:
personal equality harms can arise absent racial diversity.173 Specifically, the brief
emphasized that severe underrepresentation in the classroom can subject students of
color to concrete and quantifiable harms in the university.174
These harms arise from stereotype threat, which refers to the anxiety that poor
performance on a task could confirm a negative stereotype about a group to which a
person belongs.175 This is not a phenomenon of general performance anxiety, but
rather the more particularized threat of stereotype confirmation—a threat that has
been documented across hundreds of laboratory and real-world studies.176 When
present, stereotype threat can produce distraction and anxiety that “hijack[s] the
cognitive systems required for optimal performance, resulting in low test
performance.”177 As Professor Toni Schmader and colleagues explained in a 2008
See Toni Schmader et al., An Integrated Process Model of Stereotype Threat Effects
on Performance, 115 PSYCHOL. REV. 336 (2008).
171 See, e.g., Erman & Walton, supra note 151; Feingold, Racing Towards Colorblindness, supra note 47.
172 See Brief for Experimental Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 23–24, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297 (2013) (No. 11345) [hereinafter Experimental Psychologists Brief I]; Brief of Experimental Psychologists
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 136 S.
Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981) [hereinafter Experimental Psychologists Brief II].
173 See Experimental Psychologists Brief II, supra note 172, at *27–29.
174 See id.
175 See Christine R. Logel et al., Unleashing Latent Ability: Implications of Stereotype
Threat for College Admissions, 47 EDUC. PSYCHOL. 42 (2012). Early stereotype threat
research was motivated by a desire to explain why racial and gender achievement gaps
persisted even after controlling for wide-ranging factors expected to explain such disparities.
See Ronald G. Fryer Jr. & Steven D. Levitt, Understanding the Black-White Test Score Gap
in the First Two Years of School, 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 447 (2002) (“Even after controlling
for a wide range of covariates including family structure, socioeconomic status, measures of
school quality, and neighborhood characteristics, a substantial racial gap in test scores
persists.”); Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air, 6 AM. PSYCHOL. 613, 622 (1997); Claude
M. Steele, Race and the Schooling of Black Americans, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1992, at
68.
176 See Logel et al., supra note 175, at 42.
177 STEREOTYPE THREAT: THEORY, PROCESS, AND APPLICATION 6 (Michael Inzlicht &
Toni Schmader eds., 2011).
170
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review of the research, “stereotype threat degrades the ability to regulate attention
during complex tasks where it is necessary to coordinate information processing
online and inhibit thoughts, feelings, and behaviors counterproductive to one’s
current goals.”178 Stereotype threat directly implicates academic environments, in
part, because these are the precise areas of cognitive function essential for speeded
tasks—such as university exams and standardized tests.
Stereotype threat and racial diversity are linked, in part, because this
psychological threat—as with social identity threat—is environmentally
contingent.179 Although pervasive, stereotype threat is neither inevitable nor the
result of personal or characterological deficiencies in individual students.180 To the
contrary, stereotype threat occurs when environmental cues signal that certain
people may be negatively stereotyped because of an identity they hold.181 This
means that stereotype threat can affect “anyone who contends with a negative
intellectual stereotype in a performance setting.”182 White men, for instance, have
been shown to suffer from stereotype threat when performing athletic tasks and
when compared to Asian students on difficult math exams.183
Irrespective of the individual, several factors must exist for a student to
encounter stereotype threat. First, the student must belong to a negatively
stereotyped group.184 In most educational settings, black and brown students (and
Schmader et al., supra note 170, at 340.
See Murphy et al., supra note 154, at 884 (“These data demonstrate that rather than
being endemic to women, the experience of identity threat is attributable to the situation—
its cues and organization.”).
180 See id.
181 Emerson & Murphy, supra note 165, at 296 (“[W]hen cues signal that group
membership will not impede peoples’ performance or mobility, stereotype threat is
tempered.”).
182 Logel et al., supra note 175; see generally Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson,
Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERS.
& SOC. PSYCH. 797 (1995) (describing one of the seminal stereotype threat studies).
183 See Jeff Stone et al., Stereotype Threat Effects on Black and White Athletic
Performance, 77 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1213, 1223 (1999); Joshua Aronson et al., When
White Men Can’t Do Math: Necessary and Sufficient Factors in Stereotype Threat, 35 J. EXP.
SOC. PSYCHOL. 29, 33 (1999).
184 See Steele & Aronson, supra note 182, at 798. This includes, for instance, women
in quantitative fields, see, e.g., Linette M. McJunkin, Effects of Stereotype Threat on
Undergraduate Women’s Math Performance: Participant Pool vs. Classroom Situations, 45
EMPORIA ST. RES. STUD. 27, 30 (2009), African Americans, Latinas/os, and American
Indians across academic domains, see, e.g., Joshua Aronson et al., Reducing the Effects of
Stereotype Threat on African American College Students by Shaping Theories of
Intelligence, 38 J. EXP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 113, 124 (2002); Patricia M. Gonzales et al., The
Effects of Stereotype Threat and Double-Minority Status on the Test Performance of Latino
Women, 28 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 659, 666 (2002); Jamie Jaramillo et al., Ethnic
Identity, Stereotype Threat, and Perceived Discrimination Among Native American
Adolescents, J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 1 (2015), the elderly on memory-related tasks, see,
e.g., Becca Levy, Improving Memory in Old Age Through Implicit Self-Stereotyping, 71 J.
PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1092, 1100 (1996), and white men playing sports, see, e.g., Jeff
178
179
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women in certain fields) will face socially salient negative stereotypes about
intellectual inferiority. These students, in turn, are uniquely vulnerable to stereotype
threat. This is a burden that their non-stereotyped colleagues never confront.
Second, the negative stereotype must be perceived as relevant to the task at
hand.185 Almost all academic tasks, including high stakes exams and standardized
tests, are understood to measure intellectual ability. Accordingly, most tasks that
students perform in the classroom context implicate stereotypes about the
intellectual capabilities of black and brown students.
Third, the performer’s relevant social identity must be salient during
performance.186 This final factor links student body diversity and stereotype threat.
As noted above, racial demographics function as a powerful cue that can heighten
or mitigate the salience of racial identity and associated stereotypes.187 A student’s
race is likely to be most salient when she is severely underrepresented in the
classroom.188 Racial diversity, in turn, can decrease the salience of race and thereby
buffer students against the negative consequences of stereotype threat.189

Stone, Battling Doubt by Avoiding Practice: The Effects of Stereotype Threat on SelfHandicapping in White Athletes, 28 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1667, 1676 (2002).
185 See Steele & Aronson, supra note 182, at 808.
186 See Murphy et al., supra note 154, at 879 (“Race, gender, socioeconomic status, and
political and religious affiliations are examples of social identities that people carry with
them. Yet the salience of people’s group memberships varies depending on the situational
cues in a setting. In fact, previous research has shown that people often see themselves in
terms of their social identity that is most stigmatized in the current setting.”); Margaret Shih
et al., Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in Quantitative Performance, 10
PSYCHOL. SCI. 80, 80–82 (1999); Steele & Aronson, supra note 182, at 808.
187 See supra notes 165–166; see also Denise Sekaquaptewa & Mischa Thompson, The
Differential Effects of Solo Status on Members of High- and Low-Status Groups, 28 PERS. &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 694, 695 (2002) (“Investigations in person perception have shown that
those who are different from the rest of the group (and thus highly salient) attract more
attention than nondistinctive group members. . . . [Solo status] disrupted the learning process:
Solos had poorer recall of who said what during the group discussion than nonsolos.”);
Emerson & Murphy, supra note 165, at 298 (describing numerical representation as a
“particularly well-documented antecedent of stereotype threat”); Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, supra
note 164, at 365 (“This last finding raises the possibility that as females are increasingly
outnumbered by males, a situation that is common to many advanced-level quantitative high
school classes, university courses, and workplace environments, females may become more
aware of their gender.”).
188 See Catherine Good et al., Improving Adolescents’ Standardized Test Performance:
An Intervention to Reduce the Effects of Stereotype Threat, 24 J. APPLIED DEV. PSYCHOL.
645, 647 (2003) (“[G]roup composition—the racial or gender mix in a room of test takers—
also can trigger stereotype-relevant thoughts, and thus vulnerability to stereotype threat
because group composition can make salient one’s social identity and the stereotypes
associated with that identity.”).
189 See Ingroup Experts, supra note 20, at 231 (“The demographic composition of
achievement settings is often a critical situational cue that activates these stereotypes—who
is visible and who is scarce?”).
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The following hypothetical, included in the aforementioned Fisher amicus
brief, illustrates how numerical representation can impact the salience of racial or
gender identity:
When A is the only black student taking Medieval Literature, he is likely
to feel like, and to be perceived as, “the black kid” in the class. When B is
the only woman majoring in Mechanical Engineering, she is likely to feel
like, and to be perceived as, not just an Engineering major, but a woman
majoring in Engineering. But when there are multiple members of one’s
racial or gender group present, a person’s identity is less defined by group
membership. Now A is just a student taking Medieval Literature and B is
just someone studying Engineering. Stereotype threat diminishes in
diverse environments, because group membership tends to become less
defining of individual identity.190
Stereotype threat tracks social identity threat in two additional respects that
warrant note. First, stereotype threat is most likely to impact high-achieving
individuals who strongly identify with the relevant domain “and for whom
membership in the stereotyped group is central to their self-concept.”191 Second,
stereotype threat is most likely to undermine performance on challenging tasks. The
cognitive burdens associated with this threat begin to compromise performance
when an individual is pushed to the edge of her ability.192 As a result, stereotype
threat’s impact will predictably increase as students progress vertically through
academic domains, passing through more specialized—and often more competitive
and challenging—courses, programs, and institutions in which demographic
disparities often become increasingly pronounced.193
Two meta-analyses add additional context. The first meta-analysis examined
group differences in both high and low threat environments from thirty-nine
laboratory experiments involving nearly 3,200 participants.194 The analysis revealed
that when stereotype threat is present, measures of academic performance
underestimate the true ability and potential of negatively stereotyped students by an
average of 0.18 standard deviations.195 A second meta-analysis included data from
nearly 16,000 students across multiple randomized field experiments.196 Nearly
identical to the first meta-analysis, this study concluded that standard measures of
Experimental Psychologists Brief II, supra note 172, at *28.
Logel et al., supra note 175, at 44; see also Schmader et al., supra note 170, at 339
(“Moreover, studies have shown that individuals experience stereotype threat to the degree
that doing well in the domain is personally important to them.”).
192 See Steele & Aronson, supra note 182, at 798.
193 See Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, supra note 164, at 365; Gregory M. Walton & Steven J.
Spencer, Latent Ability: Grades and Test Scores Systematically Underestimate the
Intellectual Ability of Negatively Stereotyped Students, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1132, 1137 (2009).
194 Walton & Spencer, supra note 193, at 1134.
195 Id. at 1135.
196 Id. at 1137.
190
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merit underestimate the true ability of members of stereotyped groups by 0.17
standard deviations.197 Overall, the meta-analyses suggest that psychological threat
accounts for nearly one fifth of a standard deviation in performance.198 Translated
to the 2,400-point SAT range, this equates to roughly sixty-three points.199
At face value, a difference of 0.17 or 0.18 standard deviations (or sixty-three
points on a 2,400-point test) might appear trivial. But even if not intuitively
substantial, this difference accounts for meaningful portions of observed
achievement gaps.200 Moreover, it reveals the pervasiveness of stereotype threat and
its real-world consequences.201 More importantly, these studies expose the degree to
which standard measures of academic merit can systematically under-measure the
intellectual ability and potential of students of color.202 Rather than reflecting actual
disparities in talent, preparation, or motivation, a portion of these gaps reflect
“pervasive [and identity-contingent] psychological threats in academic
environments.”203 The research, in turn, suggests that a portion of perceived groupbased differences across educational settings is often illusory, a consequence of
psychological harms that obscure the actual, but “latent,” ability of negatively
stereotyped students.204
A series of recent interventions highlight the real-word implications of
stereotype threat and social identity threat.205 Anchored to decades of research, the
Id.
Id.
199 See Experimental Psychologists Brief II, supra note 172, at 18; COLL. BD., 2015
COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS: TOTAL GROUP PROFILE REPORT 1 (2015), https://securemedia.collegeboard.org/digitalServices/pdf/sat/total-group-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3
GW-JALV].
200 Walton & Spencer, supra note 193, at 1137 (“The observed effect sizes suggest that
the SAT Math test underestimates the math ability of women like those in the present sample
by 19 to 21 points, and that the SAT Math and SAT Reading tests underestimate the
intellectual ability of African and Hispanic Americans like those in the present sample by a
total of 39 to 41 points for each group. Insofar as the overall gender gap on the SAT Math
test is 34 points and as the overall Black-White and Hispanic-White gaps on the SAT
(combining math and reading) are 199 and 148 points, respectively, these differences are
substantial.” (citation omitted)).
201 Id. Moreover, one could imagine students, or their parents, happy to pay high prices
for a formula that guaranteed an additional 63 points on the SAT.
202 Logel et al., supra note 175, at 42.
203 See id.
204 Id. (“This phenomenon, termed latent ability, suggests that stereotyped students’
prior performances underestimate the full extent of their academic ability—that their ability
is in part hidden on these common assessments.”); see also Walton & Spencer, supra note
193, at 1137; Schmader et al., supra note 170, at 336 (explaining how this research has
established the “reliability and generalizability of stereotype threat on performance.”
(citation omitted)).
205 See generally Thomas Dee & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat in the Real World,
in STEREOTYPE THREAT: THEORY, PROCESS, AND APPLICATION 266–67 (Michael Inzlicht
and Toni Schmader, eds.) (2011); David S. Yeager & Gregory M. Walton, Social-Psychology
197
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interventions were not intended to equip students with substantive knowledge or
superior study skills. To the contrary, they were designed to buffer students against
the psychological harms that accompany these identity-contingent psychological
threats.206 The results are noteworthy. Across studies, negatively stereotyped
students who received the psychological buffer consistently exhibited statistically
significant short- and long-term gains relative to nonstereotyped students in all
conditions, and other negatively stereotyped students in control conditions.207 One
intervention, for instance, improved black college students’ grades over a three-year
period, and in so doing halved the black-white achievement gap.208 A separate
intervention reduced the black-white achievement gap of participants by about forty
percent.209 These effects are not unique, but have been replicated across studies,
including those involving women in science and Latino adolescents in middle
school.210
For universities committed to equal university membership, the social science
should invite both concern and hope.211 On the one hand, evidence suggests that
irrespective of an institution’s egalitarian aspirations, environmental conditions can
saddle students of color with race-based harms that compromise basic commitments
to equality.212 Moreover, the social science suggests that at predominately white
institutions in which students of color remain severely underrepresented, it may be
prudent to assume that stereotype threat is the default.213
On the other hand, successful interventions reveal that institutions need not
accept stereotype threat—and its deleterious impact—as an inevitable feature of life
in higher education.214 This is not to say that individual institutions are positioned to
Interventions in Education: They’re Not Magic, 81 REV. EDUC. RES. 267, 269–73 (2011)
(reviewing interventions and effects).
206 Yeager & Walton, supra note 205, at 268 (targeting various social psychological
constructs, including values affirmation, sense of belonging, and organizational theories of
intelligence); see Geoffrey L. Cohen et al., Recursive Processes in Self-Affirmation:
Intervening to Close the Minority Achievement Gap, 324 SCI. 400, 400 (2009); Geoffrey L.
Cohen et al., Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap: A Social-Psychological Intervention,
313 SCI. 1307, 1307 (2006) [hereinafter Cohen et al., Social-Psychological Intervention];
Good et al., supra note 188, at 650–51.
207 See supra note 201 (describing stereotype threat interventions).
208 Walton & Cohen, supra note 152, at 1448.
209 See Cohen et al., Social-Psychological Intervention, supra note 206, at 1308 (“The
average treatment effect for African Americans was 0.30 points, roughly a 40% reduction in
the racial achievement gap.”).
210 See Akira Miyake et al., Reducing the Gender Achievement Gap in College Science:
A Classroom Study, 330 SCI. 1234, 1235 (2010); David K. Sherman et al., Deflecting the
Trajectory and Changing the Narrative: How Self-Affirmation Affects Academic
Performance and Motivation Under Identity Threat, 97 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 591, 599
(2013).
211 See supra note 205 (reviewing successful interventions).
212 See Walton & Spencer, supra note 193, at 1137.
213 Id.
214 See supra note 205.
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mitigate all forces that trigger threat. Recall the relevant elements: (a) a person must
belong to a negatively stereotyped group215; (b) that stereotype must be perceived as
relevant to a task the person is asked to perform216; and (c) the person’s relevant
social identity must be salient at the time of performance.217
A single university possesses limited power to impact the first two variables.
Even heroic efforts would likely prove insufficient to undo pervasive societal
stereotypes.218 That said, through targeted communications campaigns and careful
attention to demographic representation across university faculty and leadership,
universities may be able to impact the salience of certain negative stereotypes.219
Similarly, a university possesses a limited ability to alter the perception that
measures of academic merit (for example, final exams or standardized tests) are
diagnostic of intellectual ability.220
Universities retain comparably more control over the third factor. As revealed
by the social science and the student anecdotes, severe underrepresentation is one
factor that renders racial identity salient.221 Universities can translate this insight into
affirmative efforts designed to avoid such scenarios. Such efforts would naturally
extend to admissions—a site of institutional governance that directly impacts student
body diversity. Understood in this way, race-conscious admissions emerge as an
essential component of a broader institutional project to ensure that all students,
regardless of race, can reach their academic potential and enjoy the full benefits of
university membership.222
The social science, in turn, reinforces the students’ testimony and
administrators’ observations that racial diversity is needed, in part, to ensure that the
university provides a “reasonable environment for those students admitted.”223 In
the next and final Part, I discuss the broader doctrinal and normative appeal of a
diversity rationale that centers the goal of equal university membership.

See Steele & Aronson, supra note 182.
See id.
217 See id.
218 See generally Kang, supra note 147 (reviewing likely sources of implicit
stereotypes).
219 See Dasgupta & Asgari, supra note 148, at 649–54 (observing a decrease of implicit
bias against women in a cohort of female students after one year in a single-sex university).
220 Growing evidence suggests that educational institutions can reduce identitycontingent threats by employing pedagogical approaches that promote a “growth mindset”
and utilize “wise feedback” when evaluating student performance. See Geoffrey L. Cohen et
al., The Mentor’s Dilemma: Providing Critical Feedback Across the Racial Divide, PERS. &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1302, 1308 (2012); David S. Yeager et al., Breaking the Cycle of
Mistrust: Wise Interventions to Provide Critical Feedback Across the Racial Divide, 143 J.
EXP. PSYCHOL. 804, 806–07, 811 (2013).
221 See supra notes 187–189 and accompanying text.
222 See Bowen, supra note 152, at 343–45 (suggesting the need to complement racial
diversity with color-conscious ideologies, both in admissions and in the classroom).
223 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978).
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III. DOCTRINAL PAY-OFF AND POLITICAL PURCHASE
In the preceding two Parts, I have invited a reframing of the diversity rationale
that centers the relationship between racial diversity and personal equality within
the university. I have argued that standard accounts continue to understate the case
for diversity by obscuring its most compelling feature: its ability to mitigate the
personal equality harms that students of color face when severely underrepresented
on college campuses.224 This final Part explores the broader appeal of this reframing.
To begin, this approach offers a new constitutional anchor for diversity. Even if not
immediately apparent, the harms associated with under-representation resemble, in
meaningful ways, those derivative of de jure segregation.225 This insight, in turn,
helps to disrupt common critiques of race-conscious admissions by revealing how
such policies are vital to promote individual equality in the here and now.
A. A New Constitutional Anchor
As I have noted throughout, my basic claim is that the Supreme Court continues
to undersell the constitutional case for racial diversity. This has occurred, in part,
because those Justices who have embraced the diversity rationale have failed to
effectively locate diversity and its benefits within the Supreme Court’s broader
equality jurisprudence. Specifically, multiple pre-Brown desegregation cases offer a
natural, yet untapped, constitutional anchor for contemporary conversations about
diversity and race-conscious admissions. These cases arose in a different era marked
by widespread de jure segregation. Nonetheless, they illuminate the constitutional
infirmity of institutional conditions that deny certain students, because of their race,
the full benefits of university membership. Thus, when tethered to a vision of
diversity that centers the goal of equal university membership, this precedent offers
a natural constitutional hook for diversity today.226
See supra Parts I, II.
See infra Section III.A
226 Before the Supreme Court overturned the “separate but equal” doctrine in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), its desegregation jurisprudence began to
interrogate and unpack the constitutional harms inherent to de jure segregation, often in the
domain of education. See infra Section III.A.1–2. See also Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337, 349–50 (1938):
224
225

The question here is not of a duty of the State to supply legal training, or of the
quality of the training which it does supply, but of its duty when it provides such
training to furnish it to the residents of the State upon the basis of an equality of
right. By the operation of the laws of Missouri a privilege has been created for
white law students which is denied to negroes by reason of their race. The white
resident is afforded legal education within the State; the negro resident having the
same qualifications is refused it there and must go outside the State to obtain it.
That is a denial of the equality of legal right to the enjoyment of the privilege
which the State has set up, and the provision for the payment of tuition fees in
another State does not remove the discrimination.
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1. McLaurin v. Oklahoma
Perhaps the most relevant precedent comes from McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents for Higher Education,227 a 1950 decision involving de jure segregation at
the University of Oklahoma.228 George M. McLaurin, the plaintiff, was an African
American man who had been barred from the University of Oklahoma Graduate
School because of his race.229 Following multiple lower court victories, McLaurin
gained admission to the Graduate School.230 Yet even after matriculating, McLaurin
remained subject to multiple race-based restrictions that triggered his ultimate
appeal to the Supreme Court.231 Chief Justice Vinson, who authored the Supreme
Court’s unanimous opinion, described McLaurin’s plight as follows:
[McLaurin was] assigned to a seat in the classroom in a row specified for
colored students; . . . assigned to a table in the library on the main floor;
and . . . permitted to eat at the same time in the cafeteria as other students,
although here again he is assigned to a special table.232
To defend its policy, Oklahoma argued that the restrictions were “in form merely
nominal,” and therefore did not violate McLaurin’s Equal Protection rights.233 The
Supreme Court agreed that, in certain respects, the restrictions were limited:
[McLaurin is permitted to use] the same classroom, library and cafeteria
as students of other races; there is no indication that the seats to which he
is assigned in these rooms have any disadvantage of location . . . [and h]e
may wait in line in the cafeteria and there stand and talk with fellow
students, but while he eats he must remain apart.234
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court determined that “the conditions under which
[McLaurin] is required to receive his education deprive him of his personal and
present right to the equal protection of the laws.”235 According to the Supreme Court,

339 U.S. 637 (1950).
Id. at 638–39.
229 Id. at 638.
230 Mclaurin, 339 U.S. at 638–40. Mclaurin was admitted only after substantial
litigation compelled Oklahoma to alter policies that had “made it a misdemeanor to maintain
or operate, teach or attend a school at which both whites and negroes are enrolled or taught.”
Id.
231 Id. at 640.
232 Id. at 640. The restrictions evolved over the course of the litigation. See id.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 640–41.
235 Id. at 642.
227
228
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the restrictions practically and symbolically “handicapped” McLaurin, thereby
rendering his education “unequal to that of his classmates.”236
Practically, the restrictions “impair[ed] and inhibit[ed] his ability to study, to
engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to
learn his profession.”237 Symbolically, the restrictions “signif[ied] that the State, in
administering the facilities it affords for professional and graduate study, set[]
McLaurin apart from the other students.”238 As characterized by the Supreme Court,
the policy marked McLaurin as an institutional outsider, a result that itself carried
constitutional implications. The Supreme Court accordingly concluded that the
Constitution could not condone conditions traceable to the state that “depriv[ed
McLaurin] of the opportunity to secure acceptance by his fellow students on his own
merits.”239
In striking down the policy, the Supreme Court expressly linked the conditions’
constitutional infirmity to their impact on McLaurin’s opportunity to receive an
education equal to that of his white peers.240 Part of this asymmetry implicated what
could be understood as learning and networking benefits—benefits denied to
McLaurin but available to his white classmates.241 This concern with unequal
education is understandable, as it tracks the Court’s then-growing unease with the
proposition that “separate-but-equal” facilities could safeguard the constitutional
guarantee of equal educational opportunity.

Id. at 641. This conclusion is anchored, in part, to the conclusion that segregation
deprived McLaurin of benefits that resembled the discourse benefits that formed the basis of
Justice Powell’s diversity defense in Bakke. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978). In this sense, McLaurin recognized that admission was insufficient to secure the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of educational equality. Even within the university,
equal protection concerns arise when institutional conditions uniquely burden certain
students on account of race. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 642.
237 McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 641–42.
240 Id.
241 Id. The Supreme Court also cautioned that the restrictions would undermine broader
societal interests. McLaurin was attending Oklahoma’s flagship graduate program in
education. By impairing his training (that is, his ability to learn), the restrictions
compromised his ability to attain those skills essential to teaching. This impairment, by
extension, would exact downstream costs on his future students—recipients of an instructor
who had been denied an equal education. See id. at 641.
236

Our society grows increasingly complex, and our need for trained leaders
increases correspondingly. . . . Those who will come under his guidance and
influence must be directly affected by the education he receives. Their own
education and development will necessarily suffer to the extent that his training is
unequal to that of his classmates. State-imposed restrictions which produce such
inequalities cannot be sustained.
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Translated to the contemporary context, the Court’s concern about unequal
conditions within the Graduate School reinforces the normative appeal of a diversity
rationale that centers the equal university membership interests of students of color.
It is true, of course, that McLaurin offers an imperfect analogy to the present context.
Policies that segregate students on the basis of race are unlikely to arise in 2019. But
even recognizing this distinction, McLaurin offers valuable texture to ongoing
debates about diversity and the merits of affirmative action. Chief Justice Vinson
reminds us that basic equality concerns arise when institutional conditions deprive
certain students, because of their race, the full benefits of university membership.242
The lack of racial diversity can be understood as one such institutional
condition: when severely underrepresented, students of color are likely to confront
racially contingent headwinds that their peers never have to face. Understood in this
sense, student body racial diversity can be celebrated as one dimension of an
institutional project designed to mitigate harms that resemble, in meaningful ways,
those caused by Oklahoma’s formal policy.243 Race-conscious admissions, in turn,
emerge as a vital tool to prevent such harms and safeguard every student’s interest
in equal university membership. This framing ultimately invites the following
question: To the extent diversity prevents harms that parallel those caused by de jure
segregation, how could the pursuit of diversity not constitute a compelling interest
for purposes of strict scrutiny?244
2. Sweatt v. Painter
On the same day the Supreme Court decided McLaurin, it also ruled on Sweatt
v. Painter,245 which involved a Texas law that barred African Americans from the
University of Texas Law School (“UT Law”), the state’s flagship law school.246
Prior to reaching the Supreme Court, a state trial court had held that Texas’s
educational scheme, which offered legal training to whites only, violated the Equal
Protection Clause.247 The state court continued the case so that Texas could “supply
Id. at 641–42.
McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 638 (describing Oklahoma’s law which had “made it a
misdemeanor to maintain or operate, teach or attend a school at which both whites and
Negroes are enrolled or taught.”). The Supreme Court has interpreted Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950), and McLaurin, 339 U.S. 637, to have recognized “the link between equality
of opportunity to obtain an education and equality of employment opportunity.” Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 n.16 (1976).
244 At the same time, Parents Involved offers a useful reminder that the Supreme Court
will not necessarily uphold a race-conscious policy simply because it mitigates harms—such
as racial segregation—that led the Supreme Court to strike down explicitly discriminatory
policies in McLaurin, Sweatt, and Brown. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 735 (2007).
245 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
246 For background facts, see Otis H. King, The Legal Sin: The Creation of Texas
Southern University, A Place That Never Should Have Been, 38 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 13,
15–18 (2012).
247 Id. at 631–32.
242
243
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substantially equal facilities” to African Americans.248 The State responded by
opening an alternate “downtown law school” that African Americans could
attend.249 This alternate school, to which Sweatt was ultimately admitted, became
the focus of his appeal to the Supreme Court.250
Mirroring McLaurin, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Texas law
violated Heman Sweatt’s equal protection rights.251 Moreover, as in McLaurin, the
Supreme Court’s driving concerns about educational equality translate to today’s
affirmative action debates. To appreciate the connection, one need only look to the
Court’s reasoning. In finding for Sweatt, the Supreme Court identified three material
areas of inequity between the “downtown law school” and UT Law: (1) tangible
resources; (2) intangible qualities; and (3) access to professional networks.
First, the Supreme Court observed that UT Law was “superior” “[i]n terms of
number of the faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of
the student body, scope of the library, availability of law review and similar
activities.”252
Second, and more troubling to the Supreme Court, were UT Law’s superior
intangible qualities, which Chief Justice Vinson described as “incapable of objective
measure but which make for greatness in a law school.”253 These qualities included,
for example, “reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position
and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige.”254
Lastly, by excluding Sweatt from UT Law, Texas effectively denied Sweatt
access to the individual human beings with whom he would inevitably interact as a
lawyer.255 As a student at the “downtown law school,” Sweatt would have been
relegated to an institution that “excludes from its student body members of the racial
groups which number 85% of the population of the State and include most of the
lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with whom petitioner will
inevitably be dealing when he becomes a member of the Texas Bar.”256 This lack of

Id. at 632.
Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573, 575 (2000) (noting that nonwhite students could attend the “downtown law school . . . .”).
250 Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 632.
251 Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 636.
252 Id. at 633–34. UT Law boasted a staff of sixteen full-time and three part-time
professors; had 850 students; maintained a library or over 65,000 volumes; and included a
law review, moot court facilities, scholarship funds, and Order of the Coif affiliation. Id. at
632–33. The “downtown law school,” in contrast, had five full-time faculty; 23 students; a
library with 16,500 volumes; and a practice moot court and legal aid association. Id. at 633.
253 Id. at 634.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 635–36. The networking disparity is difficult to overstate. Whereas the
“downtown law school” had one alumnus admitted to the Texas Bar, UT Law alumnae
“occup[ied] the most distinguished positions in the private practices of the law and in the
public life of the State.” Id. at 633.
256 Id. at 634.
248
249
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access precluded the Supreme Court from concluding that the alternative law school
satisfied Sweatt’s right to an equal education under the Constitution.257
This catalogue of disparities highlights the layered harms derived from Texas’s
segregative scheme. The Supreme Court’s analysis also highlighted inequities that
could be understood in terms of learning, networking, and signaling. In other words,
the Supreme Court conceived the constitutional question in terms that made
doctrinally relevant—and perhaps dispositive—conditions that compromised
Sweatt’s ability to realize an equal university membership. As a remedy, the Court
ordered UT Law to admit Sweatt so that he could “claim his full constitutional right:
legal education equivalent to that offered by the State to students of other races.”258
As with McLaurin, Sweatt comprises an imperfect analogy when translated to
the contemporary context. Nonetheless, when read in concert, these decisions offer
an historical lens through which one can better appreciate the equal protection
implications of institutional conditions that undermine equal university membership.
In so doing, it fortifies the constitutional anchor for a diversity rationale predicated
on the personal equality interests of actual university students.
B. More Diversity Benefits
To fully appreciate the doctrinal and normative appeal of a diversity rationale
that centers equal university membership, it is helpful to return to Justice Powell’s
opinion in Bakke.259 In striking down the Medical School’s admissions policy,
Justice Powell mobilized a critique of affirmative action that has become standard
across caselaw and public discourse.260 At its core, this critique assumes that
whatever the benefit, race-conscious admissions confer racial “preferences” and
violate the equal protection rights of “innocent third parties.”261 This premise
continues to inform the Supreme Court’s hostility to affirmative action and underlies
the Supreme Court’s erection and maintenance of an equal protection doctrine that
subjects all racial classifications—whether invidious or benign—to strict scrutiny.262
Id. at 634–35.
Id. at 635.
259 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
260 Id. at 307–10, 319–20. Evidence that this has become standard across caselaw and
public discourse is shown by the fact that this opinion has been cited over 1,000 times (on
LexisNexis). Further, several articles discuss and reiterate the opinion. See, e.g., Saverio
Cereste, Minority Inclusion Without Race-Based Affirmative Action: An Embodiment of
Justice Powell’s Vision, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 205 (2002); Emanuel Margolis,
Latching on to Affirmative Action, 77 CONN. B.J. 1 (2003).
261 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324 (2003). Scholars have persuasively
challenged the “innocent third parties” frame. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of
Discrimination: Last Term’s Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 91–97 (1986).
262 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (“Absent searching
judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of
determining what classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in
fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.”).
257
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Scholars have critiqued the view that racial classifications necessarily exact
equality harms and confer corresponding racial preferences.263 Many of these
critiques are compelling and deserve greater attention in scholarly and public
discourse.264 Nonetheless, for the limited purposes of this Article, I accept the
proposition that race-conscious admissions do, in fact, inflict equality harms on
applicants from “disfavored groups.” I do this not to concede such claims,265 but
rather to illustrate that even if one begins from this contestable point of departure,
student body diversity—as a mechanism to promote personal equality within the
university—remains constitutionally compelling.
The standard diversity rationale, which Justice Powell mobilized in Bakke,
effectively reduces the constitutional inquiry to a cost-benefit analysis. On one side
of the scale are equality harms ostensibly suffered by white applicants; on the other
side are educational benefits—that is, discourse benefits—that the university attains
from a diverse student body. Albeit reductionist and stylized, one could depict this
cost-benefit analysis as follows:
the cost:
the benefit:

equality harms suffered by whites
v.
diversity benefits to the university

As noted above, the premise that race-conscious admissions confer undeserved
“preferences” on students of color and subject white applicants to cognizable injury
rests on contestable normative and empirical assumptions.266 Yet even if one accepts
this premise, the foregoing balancing test misrepresents the full breath of personal
263 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado et al., Privileged or Mismatched: The Lose-Lose
Position of African Americans in the Affirmative Action Debate, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISC.
174, 176 (2016); Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of
Preferential Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action
Debate, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 24 (1994) (“Moreover, many of the criteria that are
unquestioningly taken to be important impartial indicators of people’s competencies, merit,
and potential, such as test scores, not only fail to be precise measurements of these qualities,
but systematically stigmatize these individuals within institutions in which these tests
function as important criteria of admission.”).
264 For multiple reasons, including some noted by Justice Powell, racial
classifications—or otherwise attending to an applicant’s race—may be necessary to
ameliorate racial inequality steeped in the status quo. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306 n.43.
265 I have contested such claims elsewhere. See, e.g., Feingold, Racing Towards Colorblindness, supra note 47 (arguing that race-consciousness is often necessary to move closer
to ideals such as racial neutrality and “meritocracy”).
266 See supra note 263 and accompanying text; see also See Kimberly West-Faulcon,
Obscuring Asian Penalty with Illusions of Black Bonus, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 590 (2017)
(discussing the fallacy that affirmative action confers a “Black bonus” and commensurate
“Asian penalty”); Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of
Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (2002) (describing the “the common
yet mistaken notion that when white applicants . . . fail to gain admission ahead of minority
applicants with equal or lesser qualifications, the likely cause is affirmative action”).
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equality interests implicated by university admissions. Specifically, it omits the
equal university membership harms that students of color suffer absent a racially
diverse student body. When this third variable enters the equation, the cost-benefit
analysis reappears as follows:
the cost:
the benefit:

equality harms suffered by whites
v.
diversity benefits to the university
and
equal university membership for all

One could argue that the foregoing depiction is not wholly foreign to the
caselaw. The Supreme Court has, at times, marked the relationship between diversity
and personal equality.267 Nonetheless, as discussed in Part I, these moments have not
translated into a constitutional doctrine that locates diversity’s value in its ability to
mitigate the race-based harms that students of color suffer absent racial diversity.268
Even when present, equal university membership concerns have remained undertheorized and under-privileged within the Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis.
Reflecting this omission, legal and lay discourse continue to default to a framework
that fails to capture the full stakes of university admissions and the constitutional
implications thereof. As a result, we continue to situate conversations about diversity
within a cost-benefit analysis that obscures one of diversity’s most compelling
functions.
This function is, of course, diversity’s ability to promote personal equality
within the university. When this function is elevated within the analysis, it becomes
more difficult to deny that, at a minimum, race-conscious admissions involve
dueling personal equality harms. Some might contend that even accepting this
descriptive account, the equality harms that befall “disfavored” applicants should
always prevail over those that befall admitted (but underrepresented) students of
color. I take up such arguments more directly in the final section. For now, my goal
is to mark that standard accounts of diversity are, at best, incomplete, as they elide
a key equality harm implicated by university admissions. As a result, standard
diversity debates fail to engage a critical benefit of race-conscious admissions.
In this sense, a framework that makes salient the relationship between student
body diversity and equal university membership reveals more benefits of diversity.
But this is not just a matter of quantity; it is also a matter of quality—in the sense of
revealing better benefits of diversity. For one, an equal university membership frame
reunites the diversity rationale with the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive
commitments to equality. This occurs, in part, by situating the diversity rationale
within historical commitments to remove barriers that hindered students of color
from realizing equal educational opportunities. But the qualitative benefits run
deeper. As I discuss in the next and final section, this re-framing offers a path to
267
268

See supra Part I.
Id.
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soften hostility to affirmative action more broadly. Specifically, by centering
diversity’s function as a driver of personal equality in the present, universities can
champion race-conscious admissions as a tool to safeguard basic normative
commitments that underlie the Supreme Court’s contemporary equal protection
jurisprudence.
C. Better Diversity Benefits
Given pending litigation and a shifting Supreme Court, the future of raceconscious admissions remains tenuous.269 The appointment of Justice Kavanaugh,
who constitutes a fifth Justice openly hostile to affirmative action, may render the
most compelling case for diversity insufficient to withstand a future challenge.270
Nonetheless, rediscovering diversity as a mechanism to promote personal equality
should soften lingering anxiety about the diversity rationale’s normative foundation
and strengthen its doctrinal purchase. This is possible, in part, because concerns
about equal university membership track the values and principles that have
informed the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence—including concerns
articulated by the Supreme Court’s conservative Justices—since Bakke.
1. The “Right to Compete”
Over four decades of equal protection doctrine have embraced a vision of
constitutional equality that privileges individual rights over group rights271 and equal
opportunity over equal outcome.272 This vision has translated into the constitutional
mandate that the state allocate public goods—such as employment or admission—

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
See id.
271 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (quoting Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Peña,, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)) (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment
“protect[s] persons, not groups”); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made
whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor
race. That concept is alien to the Constitution’s focus upon the individual . . . .”); see also
Primus, supra note 75, at 560–61 (“[T]he rhetoric and the doctrine of Grutter—and of
Gratz—are committed to individualism as the dominant understanding of equal
protection.”).
272 By divorcing the Equal Protection Clause from group-based outcomes, the Supreme
Court is able to frame outcome-oriented policies as contrary to the ethos of constitutional
equality. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 730
(2007). (“Accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would justify the
imposition of racial proportionality throughout American society, contrary to our repeated
recognition that at the heart of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection lies the simple
command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components
of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.” (internal quotation marks, citation, and
brackets omitted)).
269
270
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on the basis of individual “merit,” irrespective of a person’s race.273 According to
the Supreme Court, when race intrudes upon otherwise “neutral” decision making
processes, it deprives the individual of her constitutional right to an equal
opportunity to compete.274
This vision of equality, which I refer to in related scholarship as the “right to
compete,”275 can be seen in Justice Powell’s treatment of race-conscious admissions
in Bakke. In response to his liberal colleagues, Powell remarked that the “denial to
respondent of this right to individualized consideration without regard to his race is
the principal evil of petitioner’s special admissions program.”276 He further stated
that “[o]ne should not lightly dismiss the inherent unfairness of, and the perception
of mistreatment that accompanies, a system of allocating benefits and privileges on
the basis of skin color and ethnic origin.”277 Both statements reflect a vision of
constitutional equality that privileges the right of individuals to compete for public
benefits on the basis of their talent and potential, irrespective of race. Justice Powell
understood the Medical School’s admissions policy to infringe upon this right.278
As noted above, Justice Powell’s view of affirmative action and its
corresponding harms has long informed the Supreme Court’s skepticism of raceconscious admissions, which are seen as “racial preferences” that deprive “innocent”
whites of their constitutional right to compete.279 Scholars have lodged compelling
273 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (condemning the
Medical School for its “disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment”); see also Erman & Walton, supra note 151, at 352, 359 (“Merit stalks equal
protection jurisprudence. It is a shadow interest, treated as compelling but as yet
undeclared. . . . The Court is often protective of standardized tests and grades, which it views
as generally open, competitive, and relatively accurate predictors of subsequent
performance.”).
274 See Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville,
508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 (“The importance of this
individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions program is
paramount.”); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (“The
Richmond Plan denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete for a fixed percentage of
public contracts based solely upon their race. To whatever racial group these citizens belong,
their ‘personal rights’ to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated by a rigid
rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public decisionmaking [sic].”).
275 For a more comprehensive analysis of this “right to compete,” see generally
Feingold, Equal Protection, supra note 130 (discussing the evolution and entrenchment of a
“right to compete” within contemporary equal protection doctrine).
276 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 & n.52.
277 Id. at 294 n.34.
278 Id.
279 Id. at 307 (“We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as
members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the
absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory
violations.”); see generally John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An
Analysis of the Rhetoric against Affirmative Action, 79 IOWA L. REV. 313 (1994) (reviewing
common arguments against affirmative action).
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critiques that challenge these portrayals.280 My aim here, however, is different.
Rather than contest prevailing frames, my claim is that diversity should be
compelling to Justices across the political spectrum, in part, because it promotes the
values that permeated Justice Powell’s Bakke decision and continue to inform
prevailing equal protection doctrine.
To begin, the concept of equal university membership captures an equality
interest that attaches to each individual university student. This is not a story about
remedying amorphous societal discrimination, accounting for histories of unequal
treatment, or ensuring equal group-based outcomes. Notwithstanding their arguable
appeal, the Supreme Court has rejected these goals as sufficient to constitute a
compelling interest.281 A diversity rationale designed to foster equality within the
university is different. By focusing on a personal and present equality interest, it
aligns with judicial pronouncements that privilege individualistic visions of equality
and presentist conceptions of discrimination.282
Moreover, when institutional environments subject certain students to racedependent headwinds, these conditions compromise related commitments to racial
neutrality and individual meritocracy.283 Absent diversity, innocent students from
negatively stereotyped groups, for no fault of their own, suffer race-based harms that
undermine their ability to enjoy fundamental aspects of university membership—
spanning learning, networking, and signaling.284 The students’ unburdened peers, in
turn, reap unearned benefits that are tied to their race.285
When translated to the Supreme Court’s equal protection parlance, these racebased burdens can be understood as institutional conditions that undermine certain
students’ right to compete within the university.286 For those committed to this vision
of constitutional equality, environments that impose race-specific harms should be
troubling. This deviation from normative commitments to racial neutrality and
280 See generally Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action as
Equalizing Opportunity: Challenging the Myth of Preferential Treatment, 16 NAT’L BLACK
L.J. 127 (1998) (interrogating the contention that affirmative action deviates from
commitments to neutrality and meritocracy); Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012) (offering a rebuke of the colorblind constitutionalism that
informs the prevailing vision of constitutional equality).
281 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307–09.
282 See supra notes 268–272.
283 See Erman & Walton, supra note 151, at 350–61.
284 See supra Part II.B.
285 See supra Part II.B.
286 See Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville,
508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 505–06 (“The
dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal
opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on
inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs.”); see also Byers v. City of Albuquerque,
150 F.3d 1271, 1276 (10th Cir. 1998) (“These cases all stand for the proposition that when
a plaintiff is denied the opportunity to compete on an equal basis because of that plaintiff’s
race or gender, the denial of the opportunity to compete on equal footing constitutes an injury
in fact for standing purposes.”).
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individual meritocracy should invite remediation. It accordingly appears a modest
step to suggest that the government has a compelling interest to structure educational
environments that mitigate such harms. Race-conscious admissions are no panacea.
But as the anecdotes and social science in Part II reflect, such policies offer a vital
piece of broader efforts to safeguard each student’s right to compete within the
university, irrespective of her race.
2. Racial Stigma and Social Cohesion
An equal university membership frame also has the potential to disrupt lay
theories about racial stigma and social cohesion that continue to inform the Supreme
Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence.287 Since Bakke, multiple Justices have
critiqued race-conscious admissions on the grounds that such policies stigmatize
their intended beneficiaries and trigger racial resentment in others.288 The Supreme
Court has suggested, for instance, that “[u]nless [race-conscious practices] are
strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.”289

287 See Siegel, supra note 60, at 1295. For a broader discussion of stigma within the
Supreme Court’s equality jurisprudence, see Kenneth Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA.
L. REV. 245, 248–49 (1983); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 349–355 (1987); R.A. Lenhardt,
Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803
(2004) (“If one has been stigmatized, he or she exists outside the polity, on the margins, in
some way. This is what it means to be stigmatized. That is to say, racial stigma deprives
stigmatized individuals of the acceptance and the other tools they need to participate as
whole, functioning members of society.”); see also Feingold, Equal Protection, supra note
130, at 3–7 (detailing the lay theories about stigma and racial resentment that have traveled
through the Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence).
288 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324 (2003); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 493
(“Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm[,]” because “[u]nless they
are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.”); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 294 n.34 (1978) (“All state-imposed classifications that rearrange burdens and
benefits on the basis of race are likely to be viewed with deep resentment by the individuals
burdened. The denial to innocent persons of equal rights and opportunities may outrage those
so deprived and therefore may be perceived as invidious.”).
289 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion) (“Classifications based on race carry a
danger of stigmatic harm.”); see also Parents Involved in Comty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 790 (2007) (Kennedy, J, concurring) (contesting the dissent’s claim that
the “racial classifications used here cause no hurt or anger of the type the Constitution
prevents.”); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“This problem of stigma does
not depend on determinacy as to whether those stigmatized are actually the ‘beneficiaries’
of racial discrimination. When blacks take positions in the highest places of government,
industry, or academia, it is an open question today whether their skin color played a part in
their advancement. The question itself is the stigma—because either racial discrimination
did play a role, in which case the person may be deemed ‘otherwise unqualified,’ or it did
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Although pervasive, the Supreme Court has rarely, if ever, grounded these
concerns to empirical evidence that links racial classifications to these perceived
harms. To the contrary, they appear to rest on judicial “instincts” and lay theories
about human behavior.290 Scholars have begun to interrogate the empirical validity
of such claims.291 As referenced in Part II, existing social science suggests that the
Supreme Court may have the wrong target: for students within the university, the
more likely driver of racial stigma—and to some degree racial resentment—is the
absence of racial diversity, not the use of a race-conscious admissions plan.292
The law students’ testimony, discussed in Part II above, reinforces this point.293
Recall that their experience occurred in a post-affirmative action—that is,
“colorblind”—California.294 Nonetheless, their severe under-representation
facilitated a heightened sense of stigma and racial identity salience. Accordingly, to
the extent the Supreme Court is concerned about racial stigma (felt by students of

not, in which case asking the question itself unfairly marks those blacks who would succeed
without discrimination.”).
290 For purposes of this Article, my primary interest is to mark that multiple Justices
have staked out the position that equal protection jurisprudence should attend to these
normative concerns. Often, the Court will simply state something akin to the view that racial
classifications “threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial
group and to incite racial hostility.” Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993); see also United
Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173–74 (1977) (“Furthermore,
even preferential treatment may act to stigmatize its recipient groups, for although intended
to correct systemic or institutional inequities, such policy may imply to some the recipients
inferiority and especial need for protection.”). I do not mean to suggest that Justices should
always avoid judgments rooted in personal intuition or experience. My narrower claim is that
such judgments should be made transparently, and that all empirical claims—whether they
support or contradict a Justice’s viewpoint—should be held to the same standard of proof.
Yet as the case law bears out, this often is not the case. See generally Feingold & Carter,
supra note 125 (exploring the Supreme Court’s inconsistent relationship with empirical
evidence of discrimination).
291 See Bowen, supra note 147, at 1199.
292 See id.; supra Section II.B.2. Race-conscious admissions might also be necessary to
mitigate dignitary harms that arise under colorblind admissions regimes. See Boddie, supra
note 32, at 78 (describing the stigmatic harm colorblind policies exact on individuals who
identify by race). Additionally, expressly pursuing diversity as a means to promote equality
within the institution is likely to reduce the potential for diversity initiatives themselves to
produce stigmatic harms by, for example, marking students of color as perpetual institutional
outsiders. See, e.g., Thierry Devos & Mazharin Banaji, American = White?, 88 J. PERS. &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 447, 463–64 (2005); Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV.
2151, 2155 (2013) (“But problems with racial capitalism arise when white individuals and
predominantly white institutions seek and achieve racial diversity without examining their
motives and practices. . . . This superficial view of diversity consequently leads white
individuals and predominantly white institutions to treat nonwhiteness as a prized
commodity rather than as a cherished and personal manifestation of identity.”).
293 See supra Section II.B.1.
294 Id.
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color) and social cohesion, race-conscious admissions may function more as the
cure, not a cause.
3. A Broader Appeal
In addition to the foregoing, reframing diversity as a driver of personal equality
responds to anxieties that racial diversity is pedagogically relevant only in limited
subject matters or disciplines.295 Chief Justice Roberts, for instance, need not worry
that racial diversity’s benefits are confined to classes where “the subject matter is
racially or ethnically salient.”296 To the contrary, because equal university
membership transcends any single dimension of university life, racial diversity
matters whether the forum is a nineteenth-century British history class, an
introductory physics class,297 or an orientation workshop on student organizations
and government.
For purposes of minimizing harms associated with severe under-representation,
racial diversity may be more important in certain contexts than others. As a buffer
to stereotype threat and social identity threat, racial diversity will likely prove more
critical in disciplines and domains in which negative stereotypes hold a stronger
historical significance and contemporary salience.298 Nonetheless, when diversity’s
function is tethered to each student’s personal equality interests, diversity’s value
travels across subject matters; regardless of the setting, student body diversity
“would create an environment in which all students can perform to their capacity
through the reduction of stereotypes, racial anxiety, and racial isolation.”299
Lastly, valuing the link between racial diversity and equality does not come at
the expense of other diversity benefits.300 To the contrary, as referenced throughout,
295 See Lawrence III, supra note 17, at 774 (“[W]hen the First Amendment justification
for diversity—academic conversation—is separated from the substantive content of that
conversation—learning about the social reality of racism—it is not apparent why race should
be a factor in deciding who should participate in that conversation. ‘What does the color of
an individual’s skin matter in a discussion of quantum physics?’ is the paradigm rhetorical
question posed by affirmative action’s opponents.”).
296 Godsil, supra note 13, at 42 (revisiting a line of questioning from oral argument in
Fisher I when Chief Justice Roberts asked, among other things, “What—what unique—what
unique perspective does a minority student bring to a physics class?”).
297 An open letter to the Supreme Court from the Equity & Inclusion in Physics &
Astronomy group captures this perspective. See AN OPEN LETTER TO SCOTUS FROM
PROFESSIONAL
PHYSICISTS
(Dec.
14,
2015),
http://eblur.github.io/scotus.
[https://perma.cc/6T2R-MGPJ].
298 See supra Section II.B.2.
299 Godsil, supra note 13, at 62–63.
300 At times, constitutional analysis requires the Supreme Court to balance competing
interests. Antidiscrimination law, for instance, can be understood as a schema designed to
ensure equality (for some) at the expense of individual liberty (of others). See Erwin
Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 595, 595–96 (2001) (“The tension between freedom of association and
antidiscrimination laws is inherently difficult. Freedom of association is unquestionably a
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equal university membership will often function as a condition precedent for other
diversity benefits that already feature within the Supreme Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence. Justice Powell’s exposition of “discourse benefits” offers an
illustrative example. To attain a robust marketplace of ideas, a university must admit
individuals with different experiences and viewpoints. But it must also foster an
educational environment in which all voices will speak and be heard. As the social
science and law student anecdotes reveal, the burdens associated with racial
tokenism can compromise social and academic engagement and chill classroom
participation. When this occurs, the individual student’s experience suffers, but so
does that of her peers. Racial diversity can warm that chill, and in so doing, nurture
an educational environment that safeguards the equality interests of all while
facilitating a classroom climate that is “livelier, more spirited, and simply more
enlightening and interesting.”301
CONCLUSION
Fisher II reaffirmed that public universities may, consistent with the
Constitution, employ narrowly tailored race-conscious admissions policies designed
to promote student body diversity.302 Nonetheless, Fisher II did little to secure the
diversity rationale’s doctrinal future.303 Legal challenges persist, the Supreme Court
has shifted to the right, and renewed debates about race-conscious admissions reveal
public uncertainty concerning the merits of diversity. The future of affirmative
action in higher education arguably hangs in the balance.
For those interested in fortifying the diversity rationale, one piece of this project
requires uplifting the link between racial diversity and the present and personal
equality interests of actual university students. Even as it has traveled across
caselaw, this relationship remains absent from the core assumptions that structure
ongoing debates about diversity and its constitutional foundation. As a result, the
diversity rationale remains disconnected from its most compelling quality and
susceptible to otherwise avoidable legal and political critique. By elevating a vision
of diversity predicated on personal equality within the university, diversity’s
defenders can disrupt these critiques and, in so doing, buttress the constitutional case
for race-conscious admissions in higher education and, potentially, beyond.

fundamental right, and one of its core aspects is the right of a group to choose who is in and
who is out. However, antidiscrimination laws seek to keep people from being excluded based
on invidious characteristics such as race, gender, religion, disability, and sexual
orientation.”).
301 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). This example reflects the insight that
First Amendment principles are intertwined with basic equality commitments; see also supra
note 42.
302 See generally Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
303 Id.

